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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background 
A hybrid bond (in Finnish “hybridilaina”) is defined by Bloomberg (2019) as: 
“A class of securities that have the characteristics of both debt and equity. A 
portion of the proceeds are considered equity by rating agencies, such as Moody’s 
Investors Service or Standard & Poor’s. The bonds typically have maturities of 
more than 30 years, allow borrowers to skip payments without defaulting, and rank 
behind traditional bonds in a company’s capital structure. They are paid before 
stocks and interest is paid pre-tax.” 
The hybrid bond is, therefore, a debt security, and thus benefits from the corporate 
tax shield, while simultaneously not increasing a company’s risk of financial distress 
as the borrower can skip payments without going bankrupt. 
Firstly, the thesis examines the typical terms and features of hybrid bonds in Finland 
and internationally. This thesis then explores relevant existing academic theory 
regarding optimal capital structure of corporations. The thesis then empirically 
analyses the market reactions to hybrid bond issue announcements in Finland. It 
analyses the stock market returns for publicly listed companies in Finland 
surrounding the announcement of a hybrid bond issue in order to identify a 
relationship between stock market returns and hybrid bond announcements. Lastly, 
the thesis draws conclusions about the market reaction to a hybrid bond 
announcement as well as factors that correlate or do not correlate with positive and 
negative market reactions.  
 
1.2. Research problem 
As identified earlier, hybrid bonds have the potential to allow firms to access the tax 
shield benefits of increased leverage while simultaneously not increasing a 
company’s present value of costs of financial distress to the same extent that normal 
loans do. Therefore, it is interesting whether markets currently view the instrument 
as relatively ‘cheap’ equity (cheaper cost of capital than a traditional equity issue) or 
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as ‘expensive’ debt (debt with a relatively high interest). In addition, information 
asymmetry between company management and investors can play a role in hybrid 
bond viability.  
As the relationship between hybrid bond issues and company stock price has not 
been examined in the academic setting, this research contributes by shedding light 
on the current market sentiment for the financial instrument.  
 
1.3. Research objectives and questions 
The first goal of this thesis is to provide a solid understanding of hybrid bonds in the 
Finnish market, including the most typical terms and the main differences regarding 
how the hybrid bonds differ from hybrid bond issues in other foreign markets. The 
first research question examined is: 
1. How are Finnish hybrid bonds typically structured and how do they differ from 
hybrid bonds in other markets? 
A second goal of this thesis is to examine how the market reacts to a company 
deciding to issue hybrid bonds. The second research question is: 
2. What is the impact of a hybrid bond announcement on company share price? 
In discussions with Finnish investment bankers, negative connotations surround the 
hybrid bond instrument due to their use in financing companies that are close to 
insolvency and the product seems to mostly be used as a last resort debt financing 
product in the pecking order. Therefore, the hypothesis is that the market reacts 
negatively to a company announcing the issuance of a hybrid bond. It is interesting 
to test this hypothesis because the opposite reaction could also theoretically hold 
true in practice that a positive impact on share price is witnessed e.g. due to 
standard trade-off theory and the tax benefits of leverage. 
Furthermore, the third goal of the thesis is to identify potential factors that influence 
the market reaction to a hybrid bond issue. The third research question is: 
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3. What factors correlate with the market reactions to hybrid bond 
announcements? 
This research objective is important as it seeks to identify some of the independent 
variables that correlate with a successful hybrid bond announcement. For instance, 
the coupon or other terms of the hybrid bond or the solvency position of the issuing 
company could influence the market reaction.  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is based on both qualitative and quantitative data collected from primary 
and secondary sources. Section 2, the Literature Review, uses secondary 
qualitative sources to analyse company usage of different financing methods. 
Furthermore, it uses primary sources such as an interview of a Finnish debt capital 
market professional in order to identify market trends and typical terms of hybrid 
bonds in the Finnish market. Section 3 consists mostly of the quantitative analysis 
of information regarding hybrid bonds and financial markets. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The first section of the literature review reviews the existing literature regarding 
hybrid bonds and similar mezzanine financing products. It identifies the typical terms 
that are set in hybrid bonds, agency and moral hazard issues regarding hybrid 
bonds, the existing regulations regarding hybrid bonds and other relevant items. 
The second section of the literature review focuses on the prevailing academic 
frameworks and theories regarding corporate capital structure. These include: 1) the 
trade-off theory, 2) the pecking order theory, 3) market timing theory and 4) credit 
rating capital structure hypothesis. 
 
2.1. Defining hybrid bonds 
This section of the literature review, seeks to identify the existing information and 
academic research regarding hybrid bonds in Finland and internationally. 
Additionally, since only a portion of hybrid bonds are traded publicly, much of the 
details on terms may not be public. Due to the insufficient level of detail in a majority 
of public sources on typical terms of Finnish hybrid bonds, an interview of a Debt 
Capital Markets professional was conducted for the purposes of this research 
(Suolanen, 2019: pers. comm.,15 May). This section explores what information is 
publicly available regarding past hybrid bond issues, more specifically, on key terms 
in order to understand what hybrid bonds are, how they vary from one another, and 
any other information regarding hybrid bonds deemed of importance to answering 
the research questions. 
 
2.1.1. Structures and terms of hybrid bonds 
As explained earlier, hybrid bonds are a mezzanine financing instrument with 
characteristics of both equity and debt. This section of the thesis explores the 
European market for hybrid bonds and afterward the Finnish market to identify how 
hybrid bonds are structured, and whether there are any significant differences in 
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Finnish hybrid bonds compared to other European markets as they might operate 
in different regulatory environments. 
2.1.1.1 Typical structures and terms in Europe 
Lafontaine (2014) has created a rather comprehensive review of the European 
hybrid bond market on a high level so this section draws to a significant extent from 
his analysis, and also seeks to identify whether there are any significant changes 
that have happened after the time period. The hybrid bond market is a rather new 
market that began developing in 2005 as a response to additional capital 
requirements for financial institutions issued in the Basel agreements. 
Lafontaine (2014) uses the overview presented in Figure 1 to highlight the key terms 
present in a typical hybrid bond: 
Figure 1: Key features of hybrid bonds - framework 
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Source: Lafontaine (2014) 
 
i) Maturity 
Lafontaine (2014) indicates that approximately 75% of hybrid bonds are perpetual 
in maturity while the rest have significantly long maturities of approximately 50 - 60 
years. The research also notes that due to the coupon step-up(s) present in most 
hybrid bonds, hybrid bonds are normally called at call dates rather than at their 
maturity. 
ii) Subordination 
Hybrid bonds are senior to equity and junior to all other forms of debt. They typically 
do not place limitation on future debt issuance. It should be noted that recovery rates 
for hybrid bonds in the case of insolvency are low (Lafontaine, 2014). Figure 2 can 
be used to illustrate the subordination of hybrid bonds relative to other capital 
structure items: 
Figure 2: Subordination of capital structure items 
 
Source: Ahlberg & Jansson (2016: 13) 
iii) Call option 
Hybrid bonds typically have a non-callable period and after this, have callability after 
5-10 years of the issue at periodic timeframes (typically quarterly) at an agreed price 
point. The callability of bonds is incentivized by coupon step-ups (Lafontaine, 2014). 
Callability can also be triggered by other events. These events are typically ones 
that result in significant changes to the viability or function of the product for the 
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issuer. According to Morgan Stanley (2017) the following are typical special event 
calls where an issuer can redeem a hybrid bond earlier: 
• Rating event call / capital event call: gives issuer the right to redeem a hybrid 
bond earlier if the equity benefit classification of the instrument worsens 
under the classifications of the rating agencies. 
• Accounting event call: gives issuer the right to redeem a hybrid bond early if 
the instrument is no longer classified as equity or financial liability under IFRS 
accounting principles. 
• Change of control call: gives issuer the right to redeem the hybrid bond earlier 
if there is a change in ownership of the issuer. Typically, if the hybrid bond is 
not called earlier, it results in a coupon step-up. 
• Tax event call: gives the issuer the right to redeem a hybrid bond early if they 
need to pay additional taxes to hybrid bond holders due to changes in tax 
legislation. Also, another type of tax event is if the cost of the hybrid is no 
longer tax deductible due to changes in tax regulations. 
• Clean-up call: allow the issuer to redeem a hybrid when the amount of 
outstanding hybrid debts drops below a specified amount. 
Lafontaine (2014) notes that the most common special event call is an event where 
a credit rating agency no longer provides equity credit for the bond (i.e. a rating 
event call). It is also noted that these trigger event may force investors to sell at 
lower than market prices. In these cases, several issuer companies in the past have 
called the bonds at slightly higher rates than what the legal documentation would 
otherwise entail due to differences in the bonds’ trading prices and the call price in 
the legal documentation. This has mainly been done to limit losses for the investors. 
iv) Coupon step-ups 
According to Morgan Stanley (2017), Hybrid bonds that have been issued since 
2012 typically have a fixed rate coupon for the initial period until the first call date. 
After the first call date, if the bonds are not called, the bond would change to a 
variable or a swaps-linked coupon. The second and third call dates typically come 
with additional step-ups. These step-ups incentivize calling the bond when it is 
possible to refinance the hybrid bond at a lower rate. Figure 3 details the typical 
structure of a European hybrid bond. 
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Figure 3: Typical hybrid bond structure after 2012 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2017) 
v) Coupon deferral 
According to Lafontaine (2014), the vast majority of hybrid bonds have optional 
coupon deferral at the sole discretion of the issuer. The company can defer coupon 
payments without being in default and therefore have no obligation to make the 
payments (fully or partly). Usually, the upper limit for coupon deferral is set at 5 
years. The deferral criteria is typically set in such a way that the issuer is not allowed 
to pay dividends or engage in share buybacks if they defer interest payments. 
Some hybrid bonds come with mandatory coupon deferrals which are set into force 
automatically when certain ratios are not reached. These are typically set in such a 
way that they protect senior lenders in financial distress situations. 
For most hybrid bonds, cumulative deferral of interest is a normal feature, where 
deferred interests are due when the company begins paying interests again. Only a 
minority of hybrid bonds have a non-cumulative feature where any interest not paid 
is forfeited and no longer payable by the issuer. 
According to De Spiegeleer et al. (2014), a coupon pusher can force hybrid 
payments when dividend payments have been made. These are sometimes coupled 
with a lookback period where coupon payments are required if a dividend payment 
has been made during a lookback horizon. An alternative term that is often used is 
a dividend stopper which stops the payment of dividend if a coupon is deferred. 
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vi) Equity credit 
According to Lafontaine (2014), one of the main reasons why corporates issue 
hybrid bonds is because they are at least partially considered as equity by credit 
rating agencies. Credit rating agencies typically give between 25%-100% equity 
credit to hybrid bonds. Figure 4 displays the equity credit for most corporate hybrid 
bonds that are dated and Figure 5 displays the equity credit for most corporate 
hybrid bonds that are perpetual. 
Figure 4: Equity credit throughout the lifecycle of a dated hybrid 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2017: 33) 
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Figure 5: Equity credit throughout the lifecycle of a perpetual hybrid 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2017: 33) 
S&P equity credit for hybrids 
According to Morgan Stanley (2017), S&P’s rating methodology is such that hybrids 
have 50% equity credit until 20 years before the bond’s effective maturity regardless 
whether the hybrid bonds are dated or perpetual. Effective maturity means the call 
date where the cumulative step-up has reached 100 basis points. 
According to UniCredit (2018), S&P revised its rating criteria regarding the assigning 
of equity content to hybrid bonds in early 2018. Now, only mandatory convertible 
hybrids as well as government-owned hybrid bonds will be assigned 100% equity 
content. S&P also adjusted their methodology regarding the refinancing possibilities 
of hybrids. They had earlier indicated that all outstanding hybrid bonds lost their 
equity credit if an issuer called one of their hybrid bonds within 5 years. Now their 
methodology is such that if the repurchase is funded by instruments that are at least 
as equity like as hybrids, they do not materially weaken the creditworthiness of the 
company. If S&P’s view of the management’s long-term intention regarding the 
hybrid bonds also do not weaken, the equity credit will continue to be assigned to 
the issuer. 
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Fitch equity credit for hybrids 
According to Morgan Stanley (2017), corporate hybrid bonds are considered 50% 
equity under Fitch’s guidelines until 5 years before the effective maturity for both 
dated hybrid bonds as well as perpetual hybrid bonds. 
Moody’s equity credit for hybrids 
According to Morgan Stanley (2017), the Moody’s rating methodology is such that if 
the corporate hybrid bond is dated, it retains a 50% equity credit until 10 years before 
the stated maturity of the bond, after that, it has 0% equity credit. If the hybrid bond 
is perpetual, it retains a 50% equity credit for the entire life of the bond 
IFRS equity credit for hybrids 
According to Morgan Stanley (2017), the IFRS methodology considers dated 
hybrids as 100% debt. However, the IFRS methodology considers perpetual hybrid 
bonds as 100% equity for the entire life of the bond. Figure 6 displays the most 
important criteria for equity classification under IFRS 
Figure 6: Criteria for equity credit under IFRS 
 
Source: Lafontaine, 2014 
vii) Replacement language 
According to Lafontaine (2014), replacement language typically means that the 
bonds have an obligation to be refinanced by similar hybrid bonds or by the issuance 
of more subordinated instruments such as equity. This is typically done in the form 
20 
of a Replacement Capital Covenant (RCC). When the RCC is enforced throughout 
the entire lifecycle of the hybrid bond, it is typically done in order to protect the 
interests of the senior creditors. The RCC would require that additional junior capital 
would be issued in order to maintain the solvency cushion of the company. 
However, Lafontaine (2014) also notes the case where the RCC is only applicable 
after the first call date. This would be done to incentivize the timely repayment of the 
hybrid bond, similarly to a coupon step-up. 
viii) Other typical features 
European and Finnish hybrid bonds do not dilute equity holders’ ownerships and do 
not entail control or voting rights in the company. Notice, the voting right is not a 
mandatory criterion to be classified as equity under IFRS according to Lafontaine 
(2014). 
 
2.1.1.2 Typical terms in Finland 
In many cases, details of specific terms of the Finnish hybrid bonds under review 
are not released to the public. Typically, the press releases and the financial 
statements of companies display only broad level of terms regarding the hybrid bond 
issues. This section utilizes publicly available information regarding hybrid bonds. 
Additionally, due to the insufficient level of detail in a majority of public sources, an 
interview of a Debt Capital Markets professional was conducted for the purposes of 
this research (Suolanen, 2019: pers. comm.,15 May).  
The following terms are typically present in Finnish hybrid bonds: 
i) Maturity 
All of the Finnish hybrid bonds that were included in this study were perpetual in 
maturity rather than dated hybrid bonds (Bloomberg, 2019). One hybrid bond issue, 
referring to the Trainer’s House 2010 issue was indicated by Bloomberg to be dated, 
however from press releases it was determined that this hybrid bond was in fact 
perpetual. 
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In other European countries, such as Italy, regulations may force a hybrid bond to 
be dated in order to receive tax deductibility of interest payments (Lafontaine, 2014). 
Therefore, the exact structures of the hybrids may vary from one country to another. 
ii) Subordination 
According to press releases, similar subordination principles were typically present 
in Finnish hybrid bonds as elsewhere in Europe. That is, hybrid bonds are typically 
subordinated to all other forms of debt and senior to almost all other forms of equity. 
iii) Call option 
Companies have the right to call the hybrid bonds at the first call date which has 
varied from 2 – 5 years after issuance of the bond. This is significantly lower than in 
other European countries that typically have first call dates between 5 - 10 years 
after the issue. Event calls such as for taxation events, accounting events, corporate 
restructuring, withholding tax event, replacing capital event and change of control 
events purposes were witnessed in e.g. the 2017 Caverion Oyj hybrid bond issue 
(Caverion, 2017). 
iv) Coupon step-ups 
Coupon step-ups in Finland are typically rather large compared to other European 
call options with 500 basis point step-ups being common in the most recent Finnish 
hybrid bonds (Suolanen, 2019: pers. comm.,15 May). For instance, in the 2017 
Caverion Oyj hybrid bond terms indicate a minimum of 500 basis point step-up after 
the first call date and a 500 basis point step-up in the event of a change of control. 
Note, according to some of the equity credit criteria for credit rating agencies, this 
would constitute an effective maturity at the first call date for hybrid bonds with 
higher than 100 basis point step-ups and therefore may have implications on equity 
credit received by rating agencies. According to Suolanen (2019: pers. comm.,15 
May), these comparatively high (compared to European rated hybrid bonds) coupon 
step-ups are normal in Finland. This is because Finnish companies issuing hybrid 
bonds have not had credit ratings by rating agencies and therefore do not place 
emphasis on the credit rating agency equity credit for hybrids. This is interesting as 
the equity credit of the hybrid bonds was indicated by Lafontaine as one of the most 
important features of a hybrid bond. The higher significant coupon step-ups place 
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higher emphasis on the refinancing of hybrid bonds at call dates and effectively 
mature the bond. 
v) Coupon deferral 
According to press releases and company financial reports, Finnish hybrid bonds 
typically have coupon deferral terms that are in line with other European countries 
and are cash cumulative. That is, issuers can defer coupon payments at their sole 
discretion. 
vi) Equity credit 
Equity credit under IFRS and by rating agencies are international standards. 
According to Suolanen (2019: pers. comm.,15 May), the Finnish Accounting 
Standards does not have strict guidelines regarding the equity credit of hybrid 
bonds, however, it is currently market standard to classify hybrid bonds as equity in 
a similar way as IFRS. 
Finnish companies do not place significant emphasis on the equity credit provided 
by the Big Three credit rating agencies (S&P, Moody’s and Fitch) as there has yet 
to be a single credit rated company in Finland to issue a hybrid bond. 
vii) Replacement language 
According to Suolanen (2019: pers. comm.,15 May), replacement language is not 
very common. Replacement language was also not witnessed in the hybrid bond 
issues of Finnish hybrid bonds that had publicly available terms. This may be due 
to the similar reason why the Finnish hybrid bonds have higher coupon step-ups 
than in the European reports. That is, replacement language covenants are typically 
required by credit rating agencies whereas most Finnish bond issuers do not place 
as much emphasis on the equity credit criterion of credit rating agencies as they are 
not rated.  
Rather than the typical replacement language feature of European hybrid bonds, 
another feature that was witnessed in a minority of Finnish hybrid bonds was 
convertibility to equity. Out of the sample of hybrid issues, the Suominen Oyj hybrid 
bond issue of 2014 and the SSH Communications Security Oyj hybrid bond issue 
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of 2015 gave bondholders had the right to convert the bonds to equity at an agreed 
upon price level (Bloomberg, 2019). 
viii) Other typical features 
According to press releases, hybrid bonds do not dilute equity holders’ ownership, 
nor do they entail voting rights in the company. Additionally, according to De 
Spiegeleer et al (2014), hybrid bonds have a significant range of structuring 
possibilities when designing an optimal bond for a specific scenario. 
 
The updated framework 
In order to summarize the findings in this section, the framework for understanding 
the terms and features of hybrid bonds proposed by Lafontaine (2014) was updated 
and is presented below in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Key features of hybrid bonds: an updated framework 
 
Source: European hybrids bonds column parts i-vii by Lafontaine (2014) 
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2.1.2. Similar products, other hybrid securities and their market reactions 
Hybrid securities are a much broader definition than hybrid bonds (Lafontaine, 
2014). Hybrid securities consist of securities which have features of both equity and 
debt financing. This includes both convertible bonds and preference shares. 
Convertible bonds have a fixed term and the right to convert the bonds into shares 
according to the conditions set out in the prospectus. Convertible bonds typically 
have lower interest payments that similar debt securities as they additionally have 
the option to convert to equity. It can also be noted that convertible bonds often end 
up becoming shareholders (Lafontaine, 2014). 
De Roon and Veld (1998) aggregated much of the underlying data regarding market 
reactions to convertible bonds and other security announcements. They note that 
issuance of new vanilla debt is not typically associated with significant stock price 
reactions with the exception of junk bonds resulting in a negative reaction. Secondly, 
they note that the issuance of new equity is associated with significant negative 
stock price reactions. Lastly, the issuance of convertible debt is associated with 
negative stock price reactions which are smaller than those for traditional equity 
issuance. They conducted an additional analysis with focus on the Dutch market 
where positive but insignificant abnormal returns for convertible bond issues and 
significant positive abnormal returns for warrant-bonds in were identified. They 
conclude that the Dutch market therefore behaves similar to the other academic 
research regarding similar products in the Japanese market. 
Another type of bond worth examining is a typical callable bond. While hybrid bonds 
can be considered callable bonds as they contain the call option feature, not all 
callable bonds can be considered as hybrid bonds. The reason for this is that the 
nature of the callability feature in a traditional callable bond and a hybrid bond are 
inherently different. Traditional callable bonds are similar to dated normal bonds, 
however, they offer the option to the issuer to call the bond before maturity. This 
would be optimal for the issuer in cases, for instance, where interest rates decrease 
and the issuer could refinance the bonds early. However, the callability feature in a 
hybrid bond acts more similarly to a maturity feature than a traditional callability 
feature. This is because it is used in combination with the coupon step-up feature.  
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This is especially true in the case of Finnish hybrid bonds as the step-ups are 
typically 500 basis points compared to the original coupons ranging from 4.6% to 
12.5% in hybrid bonds issued between 2008-2018. The step-ups are, therefore, so 
significant that failure to call the hybrid at the step-up date would result in 
significantly higher coupons. As was noted in section 2.1.1.1, credit rating agencies 
consider the point where the step-ups exceed 100 basis points to be the bond’s 
“effective maturity”.  
Preferred shares are similar to hybrid bonds in that they pay out a fixed payment (in 
this case a dividend payment) which is prioritized compared to common 
shareholders. However, typical preferred shares do not have tax deductable interest 
payments. Kallberg et al. (2013) made an analysis on 427 preferred share 
announcements, and found that on average a negative equity reaction of -0.65% is 
witnessed during the announcement of a preferred share issue. Further, they find 
that the equity market reaction is negatively influenced by convertibility and if the 
firm’s accounting classifies the issue as equity. However, they also find that in the 
aggregate, the decrease in the equity value is smaller than the increase in the value 
of the issuer’s debt. 
Trust preferreds, however are a financial instrument that was engineered in 1993, 
in the USA to act as preferred shares in financial statements (thereby allowing for 
equity credit), however, considered as debt for taxation purposes (Engel et al., 
1999). Trust preferreds also have lengthy maturities, are subordinated, and allow 
the deferral of dividends for up to five years. However, 5 years of non-repayment of 
trust preferred’s obligations would result in default. Engel et al., 1999 also notes 
several studies examining the rational for issuing trust preferreds over other hybrid 
securities in the USA such as preferred shares and the tax and regulatory factors 
were often the most common reasons. 
Figure 8 presents the debt to equity continuum which shows some of the differences 
between different forms of hybrid securities: 
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Figure 8: Equity debt continuum 
 
Source: Schaffner (2010) 
 
2.1.3. Agency between majority and minority shareholders 
One factor that is not often noted in prior academic studies is the agency problem 
related to majority and minority shareholders regarding hybrid bond issues. This 
could be because hybrid bonds in the Finnish market seem to have substantially 
higher yields than in other European markets. As noted in Talouselämä (2009), 
there was public discussion regarding the hybrid debt issued by Amer and Cramo. 
In these discussion minority shareholders have displayed their worry about the 
relatively high interest payments charged on hybrid debt and whether these issues 
are for the benefit of the shareholders. 
When hybrid bonds are marketed, they are often marketed as private placement 
and typically marketed towards large, institutional investors. For instance, in the 
case of the 2009 Cramo Oyj hybrid bond issue, the minimum investment accepted 
was 50 thousand euros and in the case of the Ponsse 2009 issue, the minimum 
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investment was several hundred thousand euros (Talouselämä, 2009). According 
to Suolanen (2019: pers. comm.,15 May), 100 thousand euros is a very typical 
minimum investment required in hybrid bonds, as otherwise there are added 
regulatory filings that would be required when approaching investors. Private 
placement can therefore price out small scale, minority shareholders for example 
from participating in hybrid bond issues. 
Due to these reasons, it can be argued that there could exist a principal-agent 
dynamic that may result in a moral hazard problem between majority and minority 
shareholders in fund raising. A hypothetical example scenario could be where an 
institutional, or high net worth investor controls a majority share in the company and 
knows that the remaining shareholders are private persons with limited available 
funds for further investment into the company. The majority shareholder could 
therefore theoretically use its influence in the company to issue hybrid debt at an 
unreasonably high interest rate. The majority shareholder could then purchase 
these debt securities, knowing that the smaller minority shareholders are majorly 
priced out of the issue if the issue had a high enough minimum investment 
requirement. Therefore, the institutional investor could profit from the unreasonably 
high interest that is being paid to the hybrid debt by the company and ultimately by 
its shareholders. A minority shareholder could therefore argue that the company 
was not acting in the best interest of its shareholders equally, rather it was acting in 
the best interest of the majority shareholder in this hypothetical scenario. 
According to Suolanen (2019: pers. comm.,15 May), this potential agency issue is 
not typically very significant because if an owner wanted to participate in the hybrid 
bond financing round, extra attention would be placed on the pricing of the hybrid 
bond in order to ensure that the bond has a coupon that reflects its market value to 
outside investors.  
 
2.1.4. Regulations regarding hybrid bonds in Finland 
Myllymäki (2013) conducted research on the Finnish regulatory view of hybrid loans. 
He found that the benefits of the hybrid loan stem from the way the product is 
handled differently in different regulatory frameworks. The loan is seen as debt from 
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the perspective of corporate law and subordination as well as taxation, however in 
accounting, the product is seen as equity. Therefore, the benefits are due to the 
asymmetry between the different frameworks. 
From the corporate law perspective, hybrid bonds are a flexible form of financing 
compared to equity financing in that the terms are negotiable and they do not grant 
control rights. However, Myllymäki (2013) remains sceptical that hybrid loans would 
be used to replace senior debt or equity on a wide scale due to the significantly 
higher coupons compared to senior debt and the coupons are even in some cases 
higher than the dividend payments typically made to shareholders (therefore 
resulting in more cash outflows from the company). 
Kurttio (2016) also examined a Finnish Supreme Administrative Court decision 
regarding an alleged tax evasion judicial case where hybrid loans were issued 
cross-border from Luxembourg.  The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court ruled 
that hybrid bonds are classified as a debt obligation and only in a minority of cases 
can be viewed as equity. The Finnish Supreme Administrative Court also reviewed 
whether the product could be reclassified as equity through transfer pricing 
regulation “VML 31.1 §”, however, they determined that this was not possible.  
 
2.2. Capital structure theories 
2.2.1. The trade-off theory 
2.2.1.1. The trade-off theory explained 
Trade-off theory suggests that the optimal leverage level is the one where the 
marginal benefit of added debt is equal to its marginal cost (Abeywardhana, 2017). 
The static trade-off framework implies that companies have an optimal debt 
structure that maximizes the combination of tax benefits of leverage and the present 
value of the costs of financial distress associated with too much leverage. Miller 
(1977), shows that the gain due to taxes from leverage, GL, can be displayed by the 
formula: 
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𝐺𝐿 = (1 −
(1 − 𝑡𝐶)(1 − 𝑡𝑃𝑆)
(1 − 𝑡𝑃𝐵)
) 𝐵𝐿 
Where: 
• tC is the corporate tax rate 
• tPS is the personal income tax on income from common shares 
• tPB is the personal income tax on debt income and 
• BL is the market value of the debt outstanding in a levered firm 
In markets where personal income tax from debt is the same as the personal income 
tax on shares, the gain from leverage is equal to tCBL. 
In addition to this, there are costs associated with financial distress of companies if 
they become too levered. Financial distress is defined by Arnold (2005) as: 
“Financial distress: where obligations to creditors are not met or are met with 
difficulty” 
These can include numerous direct examples such as legal fees in the case of 
insolvency and management time allocation toward liquidity issues as well as 
indirect examples such as uncertainties with suppliers and clients regarding meeting 
the company’s obligations, liquidation of otherwise healthy business in order to raise 
cash, etc. (Arnold, 2005). The present value of these costs diminishes with lower 
leverage as there is a lower risk of financial distress. Figure 9 shows the relationship 
between gearing (increased leverage) and firm (enterprise) value. 
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Figure 9: Cost of capital and enterprise value with taxes and financial distress 
 
Source: Arnold (2005: 532) 
The static trade-off theory as described above implies that there would be an optimal 
debt/equity ratio that maximizes company value that companies would seek to 
readjust to as their companies develop. The classic static trade-off theory therefore 
does not consider adjustment costs, market expectations and uncertainty. More 
recently, an alternative dynamic trade-off theory has been discussed, which also 
considers these aspects, more specifically, how these factors develop continuously 
and therefore, the optimal leverage would develop consequently (Laisi, 2016). 
Relating to trade-off theory, Miller (1977) briefly mentions the case of income bonds 
which need to pay dividends only when earned but have no right to foreclose. 
Thereby, the income bonds have the tax advantages of debt, but do not have the 
cost of financial distress disadvantages. These bonds developed a negative 
connotation to them due to their use in bankruptcies. Thereby Miller (1977) also 
noted that the bonds were rarely issued due to the negative undertones of the 
instrument. The negative connotations can be tied in with the pecking order theory. 
Firms in stable conditions likely issue cheaper, more senior debt and as such the 
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securities might be seen as a negative market signal or only as a security that is 
only used by weaker companies. 
In the case of hybrid bonds, the present value of the costs of financial distress 
wouldn’t increase as significantly as with traditional debt as firms can defer interest 
payments without going bankrupt when needing internal cash for other creditor 
obligations during bad time. According to this version of the trade-off theorem where 
only the tax effect and the above-mentioned costs of financial distress are 
considered, companies would theoretically seek to leverage themselves with hybrid 
bonds if the gain from the tax shield is greater than the transaction costs of issuing 
the hybrid bonds. 
 
2.2.1.2. Agency costs of equity and debt 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explain the principal agent problem as the following: 
“We define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or more persons 
(the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on 
their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers there is good reason 
to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal.” 
Jensen and Mecklin (1976) show that the agency costs can include the monitoring 
expenditures by the principal, bonding costs of the agent (i.e. costs relating to 
guarantees that the agent will not take certain principal harming actions) and 
residual losses from any divergence of the agent acting in the best interest of the 
principal. 
Agency costs of equity stem from the principal agent problem between managers 
(the agent) and shareholders (the principal) in cases where management are not 
shareholders. The agency cost of equity has been detailed in Jensen (1986). Jensen 
argues that management has incentives to not pay out free cash flows (that is cash 
flow in excess of that which is required to fund all positive NPV projects) as these 
reduce the resources under their control and makes them more likely to be 
monitored by capital markets when obtaining new capital. Also, larger companies 
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are associated with increased management compensation. Jensen (1986) 
concludes that debt can reduce the agency costs of equity regarding free cash flows 
as it reduces the amount of free cash flows available to be spent at the discretion of 
managers.  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) detail the agency costs of debt. Firstly, companies that 
are highly leveraged and whose managers are acting in the interest of shareholders 
would have significant incentives to engage in risky projects that would result in high 
payoffs for shareholders when successful as shareholders would capture most of 
the gains, whereas, if they turn out badly, creditors would bear most of the costs. 
This would hold true even in cases where such projects may not have the optimal 
NPV. Secondly, bondholders could limit the behaviour of management through 
covenants to reduce this conflict of interest. These would incur bonding costs (such 
as writing and enforcing the provisions, as well as potentially limiting managements 
freedom to make optimal actions) as well as monitoring costs. Finally, the third 
agency cost detailed by Jensen and Meckling (1976) are costs of financial distress 
including bankruptcy and reorganization costs. 
Bradley et al. (1984) present a model of the trade-off theory which accounts for 
corporate taxes, personal taxes, non-debt tax shields (that is tax shields due to 
depreciation and amortization, financial distress and agency costs). They argue that 
agency costs of debt only become economically significant when a firm is in financial 
distress, therefore, they have included agency costs within their model for financial 
distress. They conclude that the debt ratios of companies are inversely related to 
the costs of financial distress (incl. agency costs) and inversely related to the 
variability of the firm value, if the costs of financial distress (incl. agency costs) are 
significant. 
For the purposes of this research, it is important to differentiate actual financial 
distress costs as presented in section 2.2.1.1 from the Bradley et al. (1984) model 
which combines both the financial distress costs and agency costs of debt. While 
these two costs are somewhat similar in nature as pointed out by Bradley et al. 
(1984), hybrid bonds can lower a company’s traditional costs of financial distress 
compared to senior debt as companies can forego interest payments when they 
need to allocate this internal cash to satisfy other potential creditors in times of 
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difficulty. Thereby hybrid bonds can lower traditional financial distress costs, 
however, the agency costs related to debt as presented above would remain in 
theory.  
2.2.1.3. Hybrid bonds impact on cost of capital 
As noted earlier, interest costs in hybrid bonds are typically tax deductible across 
European countries (Morgan Stanley, 2017). Morgan Stanley (2017) show the 
hypothetical impact in practice of a hybrid bond issue on weighted average cost of 
capital (WACC) as well as leverage in the scenarios where a hybrid bond is used to 
replace debt and replace equity in Figure 10.  
Figure 10: Hybrid bond impact on WACC and leverage 
 
Source: Morgan Stanley (2017) 
Morgan Stanley (2017) incorporates a tax rate assumption of 35% and the approach 
relies on the following assumptions: 
• a static cost of debt, cost of hybrid and cost of equity regardless of leverage 
Hypothetical Issuer Cap structure
Original Hypothetical Structure & WACC
Debt Hybrids Equity
Share of Structure 40 % 0 % 60 %
Tax Rate 35 % 35 % 0 %
Cost of 4.0 % 6.0 % 10.0 %
Post-Tax Cost 2.6 % 3.9 % 10.0 %
WACC
Debt/ Equity
When Hybrids Replace Debt, Leverage Is Lowered
A: Replacing Debt
Debt Hybrids Equity
Share of Structure 25 % 15 % 60 %
Tax Rate 35 % 35 % 0 %
Cost of 4.0 % 6.0 % 10.0 %
Post-Tax Cost 2.6 % 3.9 % 10.0 %
WACC
Debt/ Equity
When Hybrids Replace Equity, WACC Improves
B: Replacing Equity
Debt Hybrids Equity
Share of Structure 40 % 15 % 45 %
Tax Rate 35 % 35 % 0 %
Cost of 4.0 % 6.0 % 10.0 %
Post-Tax Cost 2.6 % 3.9 % 10.0 %
WACC
Debt/ Equity 0.7x
7.0 %
0.7x
7.2 %
0.3x
6.1 %
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• a hybrid is classified as equity in the debt/equity ratio 
In the approach, if the issuer replaces a portion of their debt with hybrids, the WACC 
slightly increases from 7.0% to 7.2%, however, the debt to equity ratio decreases 
considerably from 0.7x to 0.3x. However, in the scenario where a hybrid is used to 
replace equity, WACC decreases from 7.0% to 6.1% while the debt/equity ratio 
remains the same at 0.7x. 
This approach displays to some extent the value of the tax shield. However, the two 
important considerations that the approach doesn’t account for are: 
1) The assumption concerning the static cost of debt, hybrids and equity. Based 
on the model, the costs of the financing items remain the same regardless of 
leverage. For example, post-tax cost of debt is 2.6% regardless of the 
scenario where debt is financing 40% of the enterprise and where it is 
financing 25% of the enterprise. In the scenario where traditional debt is 
financing 25% of the enterprise, the hybrids serve as an additional buffer 
regarding default of the traditional debt, therefore it should be argued that the 
cost of the debt in the scenario where traditional debt finances 25% of 
operations should be significantly lower. Similar argumentation can be used 
regarding the cost of hybrids and the cost of equity 
 
2) The debt/equity ratio classifies hybrids as 100% equity. However, the 
leverage is rather subjective depending on the perspective of the individual 
financier and whether leverage is regarding returns or financial solvency. For 
example, from the perspective of a traditional debt holder, the hybrid bond 
would act as an additional buffer from default of the debt. Therefore, in this 
scenario from the perspective of the debt holder, the hybrid acts in a way that 
it lowers leverage and the risk position of the debt.  
 
However, from the perspective of an equity holder, hybrid financing would 
leverage the returns of the enterprise as the debt has a static cost associated 
to it. Therefore, from the perspective of the equity holder, the bond would 
leverage returns over time. Additionally, as noted by Lafontaine (2014), the 
hybrid bond could be used to absorb losses and allow a company to avoid 
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bankruptcy, and therefore from the financial distress point of view, the equity 
holder would consider the hybrid as equity. Therefore, it should be noted that 
the leverage is a subjective measure depending on the financier as well as 
whether returns or financial solvency are in question. 
Lafontaine (2014), however, seeks to prove that hybrid bonds can be used to lower 
the cost of capital of a company accounting for the inter-dependence of different 
financing methods. The paper applies the trade-off theorem framework and 
assumes that a hybrid bond is equivalent to 50% “vanilla” debt and 50% equity. With 
logic-based argumentation and mathematical models derived from the Modigliani 
Miller theorem of capital irrelevance and Miller (1977) incorporation of both personal 
taxes and corporate taxes, they arrive to the conclusion that adding hybrids to the 
corporate structure of companies, does lower WACC. 
As a critique of the approach of Lafontaine (2014), the approach uses a very 
simplistic trade-off theorem considering only tax shield (including personal and 
corporate) and financial distress costs. Therefore, the end conclusion is that in all 
cases, the addition of hybrid capital to the corporate structure will result in a 
decrease in WACC. However, the approach does not consider the impact of agency 
costs of debt outlined in section 2.2.1.2. We can apply here the reasoning of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) to conclude that this is not a feasible end result: 
“Potential creditors will not loan $100,000,000 to a firm in which the entrepreneur 
has an investment of $10,000. With that financial structure the owner-manager will 
have a strong incentive to engage in activities (investments) which promise very 
high payoffs if successful even if they have a very low probability of success. If 
they turn out well, he captures most of the gains, if they turn out badly, the 
creditors bear most of the costs.” 
If we consider the argument of Bradley et al. (1984), that the agency costs of debt 
only become economically significant when a company approaches financial 
distress, we can apply this to the approach of Lafontaine (2014) and conclude with 
logic that there should be an optimal corporate structure, where the marginal 
benefits of financing with tax-deductible hybrid bonds and the marginal agency costs 
of hybrid bonds are at equilibrium.  
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2.2.1.4. Quantifying the tax shield in Finland 
In Finland, the corporate tax rate is set at 20% (Ministry of Finance - Finland, 2019). 
The personal taxation of capital income, such as that from common shares, and 
interest income, such as from bonds, are classified separately by the laws regarding 
taxation of capital income and the laws regarding taxation at source on interest. The 
Finnish laws regarding taxation of capital income apply for: 
• “dividend income 
• capital income from entrepreneurial income 
• rental income 
• profit-share and capital gains 
• income from extractable land resources 
• income from sales of timber 
• certain interest income” (Ministry of Finance - Finland, 2019) 
The capital tax rate for capital income is progressive and is set at 30% for taxable 
capital income below €30 thousand and 34% for taxable capital income exceeding 
€34 thousand euros (Ministry of Finance - Finland, 2019). 
The taxation of interest income is classified in most cases by the Finnish laws 
regarding taxation at source on interest. This applies to domestic interest accrued 
by: 
• “deposits held in accounts created for the receipt of public deposits located 
in banks or corresponding co-operative savings and loan associations or 
financial service offices 
• bonds that are open to public subscription” (Ministry of Finance - Finland, 
2019) 
The tax at source on interest is set at a rate of 30% of the interest accrued. The 
deposits and bonds that fall under the taxation at source on interest are exempt from 
income taxes (Ministry of Finance - Finland, 2019). 
Thereby, in the formula proposed by Miller (1977), we can set the following values 
to the variables in order to determine the gain due to taxes from leverage in Finland: 
• tC is the corporate tax rate of 20% 
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• tPS is the personal income tax on income from common shares of min 30% 
and max 34% 
• tPB is the personal income tax on interest income of 30% 
When applying these tax rates to Miller’s formula, we can conclude that the gain 
due to taxes from additional leverage in Finland during 2019 for a publicly listed 
company that does not pay dividends can be estimated at approximately 20.0%-
24.6% of the market value of the issued debt: 
Min: 
𝐺𝐿 = (1 −
(1 − 𝑡𝐶)(1 − 𝑡𝑃𝑆)
(1 − 𝑡𝑃𝐵)
) 𝐵𝐿 =  (1 −
(1 − 20%)(1 − 30%)
(1 − 30%)
) 𝐵𝐿 = (20.0%)𝐵𝐿 
Max: 
𝐺𝐿 = (1 −
(1 − 𝑡𝐶)(1 − 𝑡𝑃𝑆)
(1 − 𝑡𝑃𝐵)
) 𝐵𝐿 =  (1 −
(1 − 20%)(1 − 34%)
(1 − 30%)
) 𝐵𝐿 = (24.6%)𝐵𝐿 
It should be noted that the above calculation is made purely on the basis of the tax 
rates listed above and they do not account for all personal tax deductions available 
in the Finnish law. For instance, according to the Tax Administration of Finland 
(2017), 15% of dividend income received from publicly listed entities is tax free. 
There are other deductions present for private companies as well which take into 
account the value of the shares, the value of the paid-out dividend and their 
proportion to one another.  
In an ideal scenario, in order to make a more precise calculation of the tax gain due 
to leverage, the tax-free portion of the dividend payments should be considered as 
lessening the tax burden on income from common shares. However, the amount of 
dividend paid out in proportion to the capital gains received from common shares is 
dependent on how often and what portion of earnings a company pays out. 
Additionally, it is share trade timing specific i.e. if shares are traded prior to a 
dividend pay-out thereby realizing more capital gains than in an optimal scenario 
where most of returns are paid out in dividends. Therefore, due to the complexities 
of the Finnish tax codes, the above-mentioned calculated range of the tax benefit 
from leverage assumes a listed company that does not pay dividend. 
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2.2.2. Pecking order theory 
The second framework in capital structure is the pecking order theory which 
considers the information asymmetry issues between managers and investors in the 
raising of debt versus the raising of equity in the financing of positive net present 
value projects.  
The problem of information asymmetry is introduced in the Akerlof (1970) paper 
about the market for lemons with regards to new and used cars. The paper shows 
with an example of the car market, how markets can break down due to information 
asymmetry between sellers and buyers. With the premise that only the seller of the 
car knows the intrinsic value of the car and whether it is a good car or a “lemon” (i.e. 
a bad car). It explains how the risk of a buyer purchasing a lemon results in 
purchasers demanding a discount for the uncertainty. This demanded discount then 
discourages and drives sellers of good cars away from the market as the prices 
offered for good cars would be lower than their intrinsic worth, thereby creating an 
adverse selection problem in the market for cars. 
The lemons problem is examined in the context of securities issuance by the Myers 
and Majluf (1984) paper which examines information asymmetry problems as they 
relate to the issuance of financing for investment decisions. It presents a model that 
shows that in environments where managers have superior information, debt is 
better than equity financing and that the raising of equity should result in a fall in 
share price (other things being equal). 
The traditional pecking order framework implies that companies should preliminarily 
finance projects with lower information asymmetry financial instruments and then 
with higher ones. The pecking order rates the costs of financing in the following 
order: internal funds, then debt, then possible hybrid securities, and finally with 
equity as a last resort (Myers, 1984). 
According to Brealey, Myers, and Allen (2012), the Pecking order theory implies that 
there is no well-defined target debt-equity ratio for companies, mainly due to the fact 
that there are two types of equity financing, internal and external, both at differing 
ends of the pecking order. The interest tax shield benefits of leverage are second 
order according to the pecking order theory and highly profitable firms with limited 
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investment opportunities seek to lower their debt ratios while less profitable firms 
requiring external funds typically borrow more. 
Since hybrid bonds are lower than traditional senior debt in terms of the pecking 
order, theoretically, firms with a more stable financial condition would issue senior 
debt before issuing hybrid forms of financing such as hybrid bonds. Thereby, 
theoretically, a hybrid bond issue could be implied by markets as meaning that more 
senior, cheaper forms of financing aren’t available to the company issuing the 
security and as such, a hybrid bond issue might signal a less financially stable 
company compared to a traditional senior debt issue. 
 
2.2.3. Market timing theory 
The market timing theory suggests that the capital structures of companies are to 
some extent representative of their past efforts to time the market (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). It argues that companies are more inclined to issue equity when the 
management believes that their share price is overvalued and buy back shares 
when the companies believe that their shares are undervalued (Baker and Wurgler, 
2002). Thereby, the variation in the share price affects the financing decisions made 
by the companies and therefore impact the capital structure of them 
(Abeywardhana, 2017). The capital structure of companies therefore is influenced 
more by stock market conditions rather than optimal leverage as equity transactions 
are timed to the stock markets. These can create long lasting capital structure 
changes (Abeywardhana, 2017). 
Abeywardhana (2017) notes several studies that affirm market timing theory 
including findings that suggest gearing ratios are negatively related to past stock 
returns. Of these, Welch (2004) is significant in that it finds that stock returns are the 
most important determinant of capital structure. Nevertheless, Abeywardhana 
(2017), also does note that some studies have also found contrary evidence to the 
claim that market timing significantly influences capital structure in the long run. 
Frank and Goyal (2004), examine the empirical evidence in order to have a better 
understanding for whether the market timing theory or the trade-off theory apply 
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better in practice. They find that the empirical evidence from the United States of 
America stock market during 1952-2000 suggest that in the short run, they found 
that deviations from the long-run relationship between equity and debt are adjusted 
through the debt market, however, not from the equity market. This provides 
justification for the trade-off theory as a mean reverting leverage ratio would imply 
that in the long run, companies would seek to find their optimal leverage (Frank and 
Goyal, 2004). 
As hybrid bonds could be considered a short-term financial instrument that has 
many of the benefits of equity, the findings of Frank and Goyal (2004) and market 
timing theory could have implications on the attractiveness and the viability of 
issuing hybrid bonds. For instance, if a company did not want to dilute equity or their 
share price was undervalued in the management’s perspective, but the company 
needed to strengthen their balance sheet with additional buffer in the short-term, 
hybrid bonds could be a rather viable alternative. 
 
2.2.4. Credit rating capital structure hypothesis 
The credit rating capital structure (CR-CS) hypothesis, originally proposed by 
Kisgen (2006), finds that credit ratings directly affect capital structure decisions by 
managers. The hypothesis proposes that companies closer to a rating upgrade or 
downgrade are less inclined to issue debt relative to equity than companies not 
close to a rating change. This hypothesis can be seen as an extension to traditional 
capital structure theories such as trade-off theory and pecking order theory. In terms 
of the pecking order, CR-CS implies for instance that when companies are close to 
a rating to a rating upgrade, they may deviate from the pecking order in order to 
capitalize on the benefits of the potential change in credit rating.  
The CR-CS hypothesis would not have had a significant influence in the case of 
Finnish hybrid bond issues thus far as the companies that have listed hybrid bonds 
in Finland have not been rated by credit rating agencies. However, the CR-CS 
hypothesis could play a critical role in the rationale for issuing hybrid bonds for rated 
companies, for instance, if the study was expanded elsewhere to Europe. 
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2.2.5. Rationale for issuing hybrid bonds 
After reviewing typical hybrid bond security features, terms and academic articles 
on corporate financing structure, hybrid bonds can provide certain benefits to both 
financially healthy companies and financially unhealthy companies. By financial 
health, this refers to a company’s solvency position, that is, their ability to satisfy 
their payment obligations.  
A financially healthy company could benefit from a hybrid bond issue as it could be 
used to refinance more “expensive” financing options in its capital structure such as 
common shares. From the perspective of senior debt holders, hybrid bonds act as 
a buffer from bankruptcy risk. From equity holder’s perspective, hybrid bonds are a 
rather “cheap” alternative to more expensive equity. When considering the 
information asymmetry issues between shareholders and management, a 
financially healthy company issuing hybrid bonds in order to refinance their equity 
should theoretically be a powerful signal that the company expects to be able to pay 
back the “relatively” high interest payments (relatively high compared to senior debt 
interest) and create value for shareholders through the refinancing measure. 
A financially unhealthy company could also benefit from a hybrid bond issue in 
certain scenarios. Consider a company that is on the brink of insolvency and 
therefore bankruptcy. Senior debt holders would benefit from the hybrid bond issue 
as it would increase the buffer from potential bankruptcy losses. As the hybrid bonds 
provide additional liquidity to a company, shareholders would benefit when the 
required return for hybrid bonds is lower than the required return of other financing 
options such as an equity issue. 
While researching press releases the following uses of the proceeds from hybrid 
bond funds were witnessed: 
Financial rationale 
• refinancing existing, more senior debt obligations or refinancing of previous 
hybrid bond issues 
• buying back of shares 
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• strengthening the balance sheet by increasing the equity position of the 
company 
• improving the cash position of the company 
• creating possibilities to take on additional senior loans 
Operational rationale: 
• funding general corporate operations 
• financing capital expenditure 
 
2.3 Conceptual Framework 
In Figure 11, the conceptual framework of this thesis is presented. The goal of this 
thesis is to examine the market reaction of a hybrid bond announcement. This thesis 
analyses the market reaction through two different ways: 1) the academic theories 
regarding corporate capital structure and 2) the practical factors regarding the 
issuance in question. In the Literature review, the major aspects regarding the 
academic theories were explored. These included the tax shield benefits of hybrid 
bonds mentioned in trade-off theory, the information asymmetry issues outlined in 
pecking order theory in addition to market timing and credit rating hypotheses. 
In the Literature review, the common features and terms present in hybrid bond 
issues were additionally explored. In the analysis section, both the market reaction 
to a hybrid bond announcement and some of the features of hybrid bonds and 
factors regarding the issuer of the debt are tested to determine potential 
relationships between certain factors and the market reaction. 
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Figure 11: Conceptual framework 
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3. ANALYSIS 
3.1. DATA 
As terms of different hybrid bond issues can vary considerably within Europe, as 
identified in section 2.1.1, the scope of this study was limited to Finnish hybrid bonds 
in order to maintain homogeneity in the dataset. The possibility of adding other 
Nordic markets including Sweden, Norway and Denmark to the scope of this study 
was also considered. During 2008-2018, this would have added an additional 18 
listed company hybrid bond announcements to the Finnish dataset of 36 listed 
hybrid bond transactions. However, the other Nordic markets varied considerably in 
terms of key terms in hybrid bonds. Therefore, due to the following reasons only 
Finnish hybrid bond issues were considered and other Nordic markets were 
excluded from the scope for the purposes of this research: 
• Homogeneity within Finnish dataset was present, however not within Nordic 
dataset. For instance, out of the Finnish listed company hybrid bond issues 
during the time period only 3% (1 out of 36) of hybrid bond issues had a 
coupon payment which was less than 5% of face value whereas in the other 
Nordic markets 44% (8 out of 18) of hybrid bond issues had coupon rates 
below 5% of face value 
• Finland has vastly the largest market for hybrid bonds in the Nordic markets 
regarding the amount of hybrid bonds issued and, therefore, adding all of the 
other Nordic markets only provides a limited 18 additional data points 
• Lack of availability of local debt capital market expert in the foreign markets 
• Additional factors such as currencies and interest rates may impact the 
analysis when considering other international markets  
The total Finnish dataset consists of 41 hybrid bond transactions of listed and non-
listed companies. The five non-listed companies at the time of announcement were 
not included in this study as they do not have a stock market reaction that can be 
analysed. The dataset used for this research, therefore, consists of a total pool of 
36 hybrid bond issues where the issuing company has been listed at the time of the 
announcement to analyse for the market reaction to the announcement. 
45 
Data for Finnish hybrid bond issues including announcement dates, issue amounts 
and coupons are compiled from Bloomberg (2019). 
This thesis is focused on the hybrid bond issues of publicly listed companies 
between the years 2008-2018. The following hybrid bond transactions (issues) 
presented in Table 1 were extracted from the Bloomberg (2019) databases. Also, 
the CapMan Oyj hybrid bond issue in 2008 was not included in the Bloomberg 2019 
dataset, however, was included in the context of this study. 
Table 1: Hybrid bond transactions 
 
Issuer name (Company, Bloomberg dataset) Coupon % Amount issued (€) Announcement date Issue date
Years until 
first call Company listed
HKScan OYJ 8 40 000 000 30.8.2018 17.9.2018 5.0 listed
Caverion OYJ 4.625 100 000 000 9.6.2017 16.6.2017 3.0 listed
Rapala VMC OYJ 5.375 25 000 000 24.5.2017 31.5.2017 2.0 listed
Normet Group Oy 7.625 30 000 000 15.3.2017 22.3.2017 4.0 not listed
Versowood Oy 11 22 000 000 23.1.2017 30.1.2017 3.0 not listed
Vapo Oy 6.5 50 000 000 31.10.2016 8.11.2016 5.0 not listed
Aspo OYJ 6.75 25 000 000 17.5.2016 27.5.2016 4.0 listed
Outotec OYJ 7.375 150 000 000 14.3.2016 24.3.2016 5.0 listed
SRV Group OYJ 8.75 45 000 000 9.3.2016 22.3.2016 4.0 listed
Stockmann OYJ Abp 7.75 85 000 000 10.12.2015 17.12.2015 4.1 listed
Myllyn Paras Oy Konserni 8.5 15 000 000 24.11.2015 8.12.2015 4.0 not listed
Poyry OYJ 7.5 30 000 000 17.11.2015 25.11.2015 4.0 listed
Finnair OYJ 7.875 200 000 000 28.9.2015 13.10.2015 5.0 listed
SSH Communications Security Oyj 7.5 12 000 000 19.3.2015 30.3.2015 5.0 listed
Lemminkainen OYJ 8.75 70 000 000 4.3.2014 11.3.2014 4.1 listed
Oriola-KD OYJ 7 40 000 000 13.2.2014 20.2.2014 3.0 listed
Suominen OYJ 5.95 17 500 000 31.1.2014 10.2.2014 4.0 listed
Innofactor Oyj 9 3 200 000 17.12.2013 20.12.2013 2.2 listed
Sanoma OYJ 7.25 100 000 000 2.12.2013 12.12.2013 3.0 listed
Aspo OYJ 7 20 000 000 11.11.2013 18.11.2013 3.0 listed
Ahlstrom OYJ 7.875 100 000 000 19.9.2013 2.10.2013 4.0 listed
Componenta OYJ 12.2 33 702 000 28.8.2013 2.9.2013 2.6 listed
Panostaja OYJ 9.75 7 500 000 16.5.2013 27.5.2013 4.0 listed
Technopolis OYJ 7.5 75 000 000 19.3.2013 26.3.2013 5.0 listed
SRV Group OYJ 9.5 45 000 000 18.12.2012 28.12.2012 4.0 listed
Sponda OYJ 6.75 95 000 000 21.11.2012 5.12.2012 5.0 listed
Finnair OYJ 8.875 120 000 000 13.11.2012 26.11.2012 4.0 listed
Componenta OYJ 12 20 716 000 29.3.2012 29.3.2012 4.0 listed
Lemminkainen OYJ 10 70 000 000 23.3.2012 30.3.2012 4.0 listed
Myllyn Paras Oy Konserni 8 15 000 000 3.5.2011 10.5.2011 5.0 not listed
Trainers House Oyj 10 5 000 000 12.1.2010 15.1.2010 3.3 listed
Etteplan OYJ 12.5 10 000 000 18.11.2009 1.12.2009 2.0 listed
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.5 80 000 000 9.11.2009 25.11.2009 4.0 listed
Finnair OYJ 9 120 000 000 18.9.2009 7.10.2009 4.0 listed
Cramo OYJ 12 50 000 000 15.4.2009 29.4.2009 4.0 listed
Ponsse Oy 12 19 000 000 27.3.2009 31.3.2009 4.0 listed
Finnlines OYJ 12 21 000 000 23.3.2009 26.3.2009 3.0 listed
Amer Sports Oyj 12 60 000 000 25.2.2009 12.3.2009 3.0 listed
Huhtamaki OYJ 10.5 75 000 000 19.11.2008 28.11.2008 3.0 listed
Sponda OYJ 8.75 130 000 000 17.6.2008 27.6.2008 5.0 listed
Issuer name (Company, Bloomberg dataset) Coupon % Amount issued (€) Announcement date Issue date
Years until 
first call Company listed
CapMan Oyj 11.25 29 000 000 5.12.2008 18.12.2008 5.0 listed
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Source: Bloomberg (2019) first 5 columns, Thomson Reuters (2019) for listed 
status data. 
Note: The listed status of the company (issuer) was checked from the moment of 
announcement of issue. The years until first call is from the moment of issue. 
Comparing the Bloomberg (2019) dataset to company press releases and 
information on their financial statements, a few discrepancies were identified and 
corrected. After analysis, the following corrections were made to the Bloomberg 
data: 
• The Finnlines 2009 hybrid bond issue was announced on 23.3.2009 
• The Ponsse Oyj 2009 hybrid bond issue had a 12% coupon according to 
Myllymäki (2013) 
• The Cramo Oyj 2009 hybrid bond issue had a 12% coupon according to 
Myllymäki (2013) 
• The Etteplan Oyj 2009 hybrid bond issue was announced on 18.11.2009 
• The Trainers House Oyj 2010 hybrid bond issue was announced on 
12.1.2010 and it was perpetual in maturity rather than dated 
• The Componenta 2013 hybrid bond issue had a 12.2% coupon 
• The Innofactor 2013 hybrid bond issue was announced on 17.12.2013 and 
had a coupon of 9% 
• The Suominen Oyj 2014 hybrid bond issue was announced on 31.1.2014  
• The Finnair 2015 hybrid bond was announced on 28.9.2015 
• The Outotec 2016 hybrid bond was announced on 14.3.2016 
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Figure 12: Annual hybrid bond issues by amount of issues 
 
Figure 13: Annual hybrid bond issues by amount of capital raised 
 
There is volatility in the amount of hybrid bonds issued annually in Finland. There 
seems to be three major waves when the hybrid bonds have been relatively popular: 
2008-2009, 2012-2013 and 2015-2016. The amount of hybrid bonds issued has 
peaked in 2009 and 2013 with 7 hybrid bond issues in each of the years. However, 
when considering issue amount, 2012 and 2015 were also rather active in terms of 
hybrid bonds issued. 
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Data on historical closing stock prices, daily stock returns including dividends and 
index prices was compiled from financial market data available from the Thomson 
Reuters (2019) database.  
 
3.2. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
This thesis utilizes a similar method as that used by Masulis & Korwar (1986) in 
examining common stock price adjustments to announcements of underwritten 
common stock offerings. 
In order to identify the raw returns of individual stocks, the closing stock prices and 
the daily dividend adjusted stock returns were used to calculate “adjusted closing 
prices” which account for potential returns from dividends paid out under the 
assumption that dividends would be reinvested beginning from the 1st of January 
2007. 
The announcement period used includes both returns for the announcement date 
(“AD” or “event day”) as well as the trading day following the announcement 
because the announcement could have happened after trading has closed, thereby, 
the compounded daily return between the following two variables is used as the 
daily announcement return: 
1. The adjusted closing stock price the trading day before the announcement 
day (Closing price, EUR, AD-1) 
2. The adjusted closing stock price for the trading day following the 
announcement (Closing price, EUR, AD+1) 
The reference period is considered as the daily returns during the 60 trading days 
immediately prior to the announcement period and seeks to identify the ‘normal’ rate 
of return of the stock. Robustness checks for 120 day and 252 day reference periods 
were also conducted. The compounded daily return between the following two 
variables was calculated to get the daily reference return: 
1. The adjusted closing stock price 62 trading days prior to the announcement 
day (Adjusted closing price at beginning of reference period). For the 
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robustness checks, this was adjusted to correspond with the relevant 
reference period. 
2. The adjusted closing stock price the trading day before the announcement 
day (Closing price, EUR, AD-1) 
A daily return for each stock for each event day is calculated by using the stock’s 
individual returns for the time periods in question. The difference between the daily 
returns over the announcement period and the reference period shows the 
estimated impact of a hybrid bond announcement to the share price. 
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Table 2: Daily return calculations for the reference and announcement periods 
 
 
Furthermore, as market movements may affect the returns of a share on a specific 
day, the impact of market movements was adjusted in order to identify more 
accurately the stock price reaction to the hybrid bond announcement. As all of the 
companies under review were Finnish listed companies, the OMX Helsinki 25 index 
was used to benchmark market returns. The compounded daily OMX Helsinki 25 
index returns for each of the applicable time periods (both the reference and 
announcement periods of each hybrid bond issue) were calculated and then 
deducted from the absolute return in order to get the market adjusted returns. 
Reference period (days) 60
Issuer Name
Announcement 
Date (AD) Issue Date
Adjusted 
closing price 
(EUR, AD - 1)
Adjusted closing 
price (EUR, AD + 
1)
Adjusted 
closing price at 
beginning of 
reference 
period
Daily reference 
return (%)
Daily 
announcement 
return (%)
Market reaction 
(Ann. return - 
Ref. return)
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 17.9.2018 4.18 4.16 4.78 -0.2 % -0.3 % -0.1 %
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 16.6.2017 8.03 7.96 7.72 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.5 %
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 31.5.2017 5.85 5.86 6.39 -0.1 % 0.1 % 0.3 %
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 27.5.2016 11.87 11.80 11.57 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 24.3.2016 4.43 4.30 4.84 -0.1 % -1.5 % -1.4 %
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 22.3.2016 3.90 3.96 3.88 0.0 % 0.8 % 0.8 %
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 17.12.2015 9.73 9.15 10.45 -0.1 % -3.0 % -2.9 %
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 25.11.2015 4.66 4.71 4.62 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.5 %
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 13.10.2015 3.25 3.17 3.06 0.1 % -1.2 % -1.3 %
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 30.3.2015 4.34 4.26 2.92 0.7 % -0.9 % -1.5 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 11.3.2014 16.31 16.57 16.96 -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.9 %
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 20.2.2014 2.66 2.68 2.68 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 10.2.2014 2.53 2.43 2.43 0.1 % -2.0 % -2.0 %
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 20.12.2013 1.13 1.11 1.60 -0.6 % -0.9 % -0.3 %
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 12.12.2013 11.51 11.33 9.14 0.4 % -0.8 % -1.2 %
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 18.11.2013 8.42 8.72 8.58 0.0 % 1.7 % 1.8 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 2.10.2013 11.61 11.40 12.74 -0.2 % -0.9 % -0.7 %
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 2.9.2013 1.86 1.84 1.86 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 27.5.2013 1.01 0.92 1.01 0.0 % -4.5 % -4.5 %
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 26.3.2013 3.86 3.89 3.57 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.2 %
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 28.12.2012 3.08 3.05 3.42 -0.2 % -0.5 % -0.3 %
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 5.12.2012 4.02 4.17 4.13 0.0 % 1.9 % 1.9 %
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 26.11.2012 2.31 2.30 2.16 0.1 % -0.2 % -0.3 %
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 29.3.2012 3.75 3.68 3.86 -0.1 % -0.9 % -0.9 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 30.3.2012 21.94 21.29 20.64 0.1 % -1.5 % -1.6 %
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 15.1.2010 0.57 0.50 0.62 -0.1 % -6.1 % -5.9 %
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 1.12.2009 3.08 3.04 3.23 -0.1 % -0.7 % -0.6 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 25.11.2009 8.28 8.46 7.24 0.2 % 1.1 % 0.8 %
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 7.10.2009 4.64 4.64 3.97 0.3 % 0.0 % -0.3 %
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 29.4.2009 5.29 5.51 5.10 0.1 % 2.1 % 2.1 %
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 31.3.2009 3.67 3.55 4.59 -0.4 % -1.8 % -1.4 %
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 26.3.2009 5.43 4.96 5.80 -0.1 % -4.5 % -4.4 %
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 12.3.2009 4.24 4.36 4.53 -0.1 % 1.4 % 1.5 %
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 5.12.2008 1.33 1.30 2.47 -1.0 % -1.2 % -0.2 %
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 28.11.2008 5.71 5.15 7.22 -0.4 % -5.0 % -4.6 %
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 27.6.2008 4.04 4.06 5.30 -0.5 % 0.3 % 0.8 %
Min -1.0 % -6.1 % -5.9 %
Lower quartile -0.1 % -1.3 % -1.4 %
Median 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.3 %
Average -0.1 % -0.8 % -0.7 %
Upper quartile 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.3 %
Max 0.7 % 2.1 % 2.1 %
Standard deviation 0.3 % 1.9 % 1.9 %
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Table 3: Market adjustments 
 
Reference period (days) 60
Issuer Name
Announcement 
Date (AD)
Daily reference 
return (%)
Daily 
announcement 
return (%)
Daily reference 
market return
Daily 
announcement 
market return
Market adjusted 
reference 
return
Market adjusted 
announcement 
return
Market adjusted 
market reaction 
(Ann. return - Ref. 
return)
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 -0.2 % -0.3 % 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.3 % 0.1 % 0.3 %
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 0.1 % -0.4 % 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.1 % -0.4 % -0.3 %
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 -0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 % -0.3 % 0.0 % 0.2 %
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 0.0 % -0.3 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.0 % -0.5 % -0.5 %
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 -0.1 % -1.5 % -0.1 % 0.5 % -0.1 % -2.1 % -2.0 %
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 0.0 % 0.8 % -0.1 % -0.4 % 0.2 % 1.2 % 1.0 %
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 -0.1 % -3.0 % 0.1 % -0.8 % -0.2 % -2.2 % -1.9 %
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.1 % 1.0 % -0.1 % -0.5 % -0.4 %
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 0.1 % -1.2 % -0.2 % -0.9 % 0.3 % -0.2 % -0.5 %
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 0.7 % -0.9 % 0.4 % 0.7 % 0.3 % -1.6 % -1.9 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.0 % 1.3 % -0.1 % -0.5 % -0.4 %
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % -0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 0.1 % -2.0 % 0.1 % -1.3 % 0.0 % -0.7 % -0.7 %
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 -0.6 % -0.9 % 0.0 % 0.2 % -0.6 % -1.1 % -0.5 %
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 0.4 % -0.8 % 0.2 % -1.4 % 0.2 % 0.6 % 0.4 %
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 0.0 % 1.7 % 0.2 % -0.4 % -0.3 % 2.1 % 2.4 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 -0.2 % -0.9 % 0.3 % 0.3 % -0.5 % -1.2 % -0.7 %
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 0.0 % -0.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 0.0 % -4.5 % 0.0 % -0.2 % 0.0 % -4.2 % -4.2 %
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 -0.2 % -0.5 % 0.1 % 0.7 % -0.3 % -1.1 % -0.8 %
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 0.0 % 1.9 % 0.0 % 1.1 % -0.1 % 0.7 % 0.8 %
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 0.1 % -0.2 % 0.0 % -0.3 % 0.1 % 0.1 % -0.1 %
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 -0.1 % -0.9 % 0.2 % 0.2 % -0.2 % -1.2 % -1.0 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 0.1 % -1.5 % 0.2 % 1.1 % -0.1 % -2.6 % -2.5 %
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 -0.1 % -6.1 % 0.1 % -0.7 % -0.3 % -5.4 % -5.1 %
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 -0.1 % -0.7 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.2 % -0.1 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 0.2 % 1.1 % 0.1 % 1.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 % -0.1 %
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.4 % -0.8 % -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.9 %
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 0.1 % 2.1 % 0.0 % 1.4 % 0.1 % 0.7 % 0.6 %
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 -0.4 % -1.8 % -0.2 % -3.0 % -0.2 % 1.3 % 1.5 %
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 -0.1 % -4.5 % -0.2 % -0.1 % 0.1 % -4.4 % -4.5 %
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 -0.1 % 1.4 % -0.2 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 1.3 % 1.2 %
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 -1.0 % -1.2 % -0.6 % 0.2 % -0.4 % -1.4 % -1.0 %
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 -0.4 % -5.0 % -0.7 % -3.2 % 0.3 % -1.9 % -2.2 %
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 -0.5 % 0.3 % 0.0 % -1.0 % -0.5 % 1.3 % 1.8 %
Min -1.0 % -6.1 % -0.6 % -5.4 % -5.1 %
Lower quartile -0.1 % -1.3 % -0.2 % -1.2 % -1.0 %
Median 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.4 % -0.4 %
Average -0.1 % -0.8 % -0.1 % -0.6 % -0.6 %
Upper quartile 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.4 %
Max 0.7 % 2.1 % 0.3 % 2.1 % 2.4 %
Standard deviation 0.3 % 1.9 % 0.2 % 1.6 % 1.7 %
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Figure 14: Histogram of market adjusted market reaction 
 
The results indicate that on average the announcement of a hybrid bond issue is 
expected to underperform the market by an average of -0.6% with an interquartile 
range of -1.0%-0.4%. The data seems to be distributed normally. The majority of 
hybrid bond issues have resulted in a negative market reaction, however, certain 
companies’ have witnessed positive reactions around the event day relative to the 
market. 
The data was also checked with 120 and 252 trading day reference periods in order 
to identify whether altering the reference period would alter the end results. Table 4 
displays the results of the robustness check. The average is the same with each of 
the reference periods and the median and standard deviation of the data vary by ± 
0.1% in the robustness check and are therefore rather close to the 60 day reference 
period calculations. The calculations behind the robustness checks are presented 
in Appendix I. 
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Table 4: Robustness check 
 
 
3.2.1. Significance testing 
In order to test for significance of the data, a one sample t-test was conducted. The 
median and averages suggest a negative market reaction to the news of a hybrid 
bond issue. However, as there is a theoretical possibility that the announcement of 
a hybrid bond issue might have a positive impact on the market reaction, a two-
tailed t-test can be used to identify the significance of either a positive or a negative 
market reaction to the announcement of a hybrid bond issue. The null hypothesis 
for the test is that the mean of the sample is equal to zero: 
𝐻0: 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 = 0 
The alternative hypothesis is that the mean is less than zero if the t Stat is negative 
or that the mean is greater than 0 if the t Stat is positive: 
𝐻1: 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛 <> 0 
The results of the two-tailed test are displayed on Table 5. 
Robustness check
Reference period 60 days 120 days 252 days Average
Min -5.1 % -5.0 % -5.3 % -5.1 %
Lower quartile -1.0 % -1.3 % -1.3 % -1.2 %
Median -0.4 % -0.3 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
Average -0.6 % -0.6 % -0.6 % -0.6 %
Upper quartile 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.4 % 0.4 %
Max 2.4 % 2.2 % 2.2 % 2.3 %
Standard deviation 1.7 % 1.6 % 1.6 % 1.6 %
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Table 5: Two tailed t-test 
 
As can be seen, the null hypothesis can be rejected at a 5% significance level for 
all reference periods in the robustness check. The average of the p-values is 0.043, 
which means that in general the null hypothesis can be rejected and we can accept 
the alternative hypothesis. As the t Stat is negative for all of the reference periods, 
it can be concluded that the market reacts negatively to a hybrid bond 
announcement at a statistically significant level. 
Another test for significance was conducted in the form of a non-parametric sign 
test. This test is insensitive to outliers as it only analyses the signs (whether positive 
or negative) of the individual sample set of market reactions. The test does not take 
into account how positive or negative the reaction is. The null hypothesis of the test 
is that the probability of a negative market reaction is 50%: 
𝑝 = Pr(𝑋 < 0) ;  𝐻0: 𝑝 ≤ 0.5 
The alternative hypothesis is that the probability of a negative reaction is greater 
than 50%: 
𝑝 = Pr(𝑋 < 0) ;  𝐻0: 𝑝 > 0.5 
The sign test results are outlined in Table 6. 
Table 6: Sign test results 
 
Two tailed t-test
Reference period 60 days 120 days 252 days Average
Observations 36 36 36 36
Hypothesized Mean 0 0 0 0
df 35 35 35 35
t Stat -2.042 -2.126 -2.142 -2.104
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.049 0.041 0.039 0.043
t Critical two-tail 2.030 2.030 2.030 2.030
Sign test
Reference period 60 days 120 days 252 days Average
# of positive reactions 13 14 15 n.a.
# of negative reactions 23 22 21 n.a.
Total 36 36 36 n.a.
p-value 0.07 0.12 0.20 0.13
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As can be seen from the data, there are only two additional negative reactions that 
can be witnessed in the 60 day reference period sign test compared to the 252 day 
reference period. These two reactions result in different conclusions based on the 
sign test. The sign test is statistically significant at a 10% significance level for only 
the 60 day reference period. The null hypothesis cannot be rejected in the 
robustness checks with reference periods of 120 or 252 days at the same level of 
significance. The average p-value the three reference periods is 0.13. This means 
that the null hypothesis fails to be rejected at a statistically significant level even at 
10% significance if considering all three reference period lengths with equal 
weighting.  
Due to the resulting p-value of the test being sensitive to the reference period in 
question, it is difficult to make meaningful conclusions from this sign test alone. If a 
larger dataset was present, it might result in added significance to this testing 
method. 
 
 
3.2.2. Regression analysis 
After testing the significance of the sample set, the next research goal is to explore 
potential factors that correlate with successful (and unsuccessful) market reactions 
to hybrid bond announcements. This is done by utilizing several regression analyses 
where the dependent variable is the market adjusted market reaction. 
 
Regressing market reaction with coupon percentage 
As the coupon is a measure of how expensive debt is, regressing the market 
adjusted market reaction to the coupon percentage is interesting to identify whether 
this has impact on the announcement return. The hypothesis is that the higher the 
coupon payment, the more negative the market reaction to the announcement of 
the hybrid bond. It should be noted, however, that the exact coupon may not be 
publicly known yet on the announcement day for all hybrid bond announcements as 
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the announcement date is the date when the company has expressed its plans to 
issue the hybrid bond. In some cases, the yield and size of the issue were indicated 
at a later date from the initial announcement date. Table 7 shows the results when 
regressing the market-adjusted market reaction (dependent variable) with the 
coupon of the issue (independent variable): 
Table 7: Regression of market reaction with the coupon of the issue 
 
 
As the market reaction happens during the announcement of the intention to issue 
hybrid bonds, some companies may not have the exact terms locked down yet when 
they publicly announce the issue, while other companies issue a press release after 
the terms are set. The slope of the regression is negative and the p value ranges 
for the coupon coefficient ranges from 0.32-0.39. The result is therefore not 
statistically significant. However, the negative slope of the regression could imply 
the following about the relationship between coupons and market reactions: 
1) A higher coupon would lead to a decreased market reaction. This seems 
logical as a higher than expected coupon payment has implications on the 
earnings potential of the equity. 
2) A negative market reaction would lead to an increase in the coupon 
percentage. If there is a negative market reaction, this could mean that there 
is low interest in the issuance of the hybrid debt and could impact the pricing 
point through less competitive interest in financing the debt. 
Coupon regression - Robustness check
Reference period 60 days 120 days 252 days Average
Multiple R 17.0 % 16.0 % 14.9 % 16.0 %
R Square 2.9 % 2.6 % 2.2 % 2.6 %
Adjusted R Square 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.7 % -0.3 %
Standard Error 1.7 % 1.6 % 1.7 % 1.6 %
Coupon regression
Reference period Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t stat p value
Intercept 0.006 0.012 0.514 0.611
Coupon -0.001 0.001 -1.004 0.323
Intercept 0.005 0.012 0.440 0.663
Coupon -0.001 0.001 -0.947 0.350
Intercept 0.004 0.012 0.369 0.715
Coupon -0.001 0.001 -0.876 0.387
60 days
120 days
252 days
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The R-square is on average 2.6% between the robustness checks. The adjusted R-
square is positive for only the 60 day reference period. The R-square implies that 
the coupon percentage of the hybrid bond issue may explain a rather small amount 
of the variation in the adjusted market returns. 
 
Regressing market reaction with the Altman Z-Score 
The Altman Z-Score is a measure of the bankruptcy risk of a company where a 
higher score implies lower bankruptcy risk for a given entity (Altman, 1968). This 
tests goal is to identify whether companies that are likelier to go bankrupt according 
to the Altman Z-Score model would have a differing market reaction to a hybrid bond 
announcement compared to a company that is otherwise not at large risk for 
bankruptcy according to the model. The hypothesis for this is that companies with a 
lower Altman Z-Score would have lower market reactions compared to hybrid bond 
announcements of companies with a higher Altman Z-Score. 
The Altman Z-Score that this study uses is the original proposed in 1968 for publicly 
listed companies (Altman et al., 2014): 
𝑍 = 1.2𝑋1 + 1.4𝑋2 + 3.3𝑋3 + 0.6𝑋4 + 0.99𝑋5 
Where: 
• X1 = Working capital / Total assets 
• X2 = Retained earnings / Total assets 
• X3 = Earnings before interest and taxes (“EBIT”) / Total assets 
• X4 = Market value of equity / Book value of total liabilities 
• X5 = Sales / Total assets 
Table 8 displays the raw data for the Altman Z-Score calculations, compiled from 
the Thomson Reuters (2019) database: 
58 
Table 8: Financials for Altman Z-Score calculations 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters (2019) 
Next, Table 9 shows the calculation of the Altman Z-Score: 
Issuer name (Company)
Announcement 
date
Date of 
financials
Current 
assets
Current 
liabilities
Working 
capital Total assets
Total 
liabilities
Retained 
earnings Sales EBIT
Market 
value of 
equity
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 Q2 2018 268.3 278.8 -10.5 918.9 624.0 18.0 1772.3 -58.6 155.4
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 Q1 2017 665.9 725.5 -59.6 1110.4 955.8 163.0 2378.1 -55.3 923.1
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 Q4 2016 192.7 126.9 65.8 316.1 188.6 106.4 260.6 7.2 158.3
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 Q1 2016 124.6 72.5 52.1 296.3 193.6 75.0 442.3 20.9 227.2
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 Q4 2015 942.6 711.5 231.1 1531.4 1129.6 319.6 1201.2 -12.3 615.7
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 Q4 2015 490.8 309.6 181.2 762.6 486.2 95.7 719.1 24.3 183.9
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 Q3 2015 349.2 596.0 -246.8 2337.5 1315.0 53.7 1324.3 -78.7 501.8
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 Q3 2015 258.2 249.5 8.7 427.8 335.4 32.8 567.2 -8.2 213.3
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 Q3 2015 979.0 992.6 -13.6 1955.8 1398.8 9.9 2239.6 -4.7 392.4
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 Q4 2014 13.6 9.7 3.9 17.6 9.7 -1.0 16.2 0.2 77.7
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 Q4 2013 980.2 920.3 59.9 1342.7 1019.2 247.8 2020.1 -89.3 298.2
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 Q4 2013 938.3 1020.3 -82.0 1500.1 1222.0 221.5 1619.7 29.3 385.4
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 Q4 2013 105.1 81.6 23.5 238.9 160.4 -51.1 373.7 18.9 113.8
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 Q3 2013 12.2 11.7 0.5 42.2 23.4 3.2 27.9 2.1 50.5
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 Q3 2013 592.2 1252.2 -660.0 3459.0 2639.0 548.9 2152.8 -229.2 1004.6
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 Q3 2013 139.6 128.2 11.4 308.8 229.5 50.9 486.1 10.7 163.2
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 Q2 2013 371.2 475.6 -104.4 1157.9 817.6 91.8 1009.2 22.0 409.7
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 Q2 2013 147.4 265.9 -118.5 486.9 417.9 -25.7 506.0 -3.6 32.9
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 Q1 2013 58.3 47.0 11.3 148.5 123.9 -0.1 137.5 1.3 39.0
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 Q4 2012 34.1 143.5 -109.4 1082.7 709.2 121.7 107.3 48.0 278.9
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 Q3 2012 568.1 297.4 270.7 625.8 463.4 67.2 733.9 17.4 122.1
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 Q3 2012 53.3 392.1 -338.8 3446.9 2099.6 545.4 263.1 196.2 903.0
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 Q3 2012 743.7 909.2 -165.5 2304.4 1552.8 125.7 2413.9 -2.8 264.4
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 Q4 2011 145.2 268.7 -123.5 436.8 403.0 3.4 576.4 22.5 59.0
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 Q4 2011 891.8 662.7 229.1 1242.8 894.1 210.6 2183.9 44.1 367.8
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 Q4 2009 6.7 6.7 0.0 77.2 25.9 4.9 20.5 -2.1 29.9
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 Q3 2009 27.7 37.2 -9.5 61.3 47.6 18.2 107.1 -0.8 60.1
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 Q3 2009 551.6 492.1 59.5 1588.7 964.4 364.9 1594.7 -23.5 325.2
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 Q2 2009 525.5 953.7 -428.2 2218.0 1497.1 291.8 2080.8 -161.0 480.3
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 Q1 2009 134.5 146.0 -11.5 973.7 664.0 119.9 576.1 75.4 71.4
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 Q4 2008 130.5 80.1 50.4 174.8 107.7 62.5 293.0 13.6 125.8
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 Q4 2008 89.3 202.2 -112.9 1534.4 1097.9 332.9 738.2 35.4 262.5
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 Q4 2008 973.9 682.9 291.0 1661.9 1156.4 275.6 1576.6 78.9 368.7
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 Q3 2008 16.8 31.9 -15.1 129.4 70.8 13.7 35.1 1.7 144.1
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 Q3 2008 833.9 767.3 66.6 2196.9 1434.9 467.5 2269.0 -5.3 873.7
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 Q1 2008 155.5 677.3 -521.8 3009.3 2119.8 409.2 198.8 199.8 470.8
Financials from Thomson Reuters Eikon (2019, €m)
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Table 9: Altman Z-Score Calculations 
 
Table 10 then shows the results of the regression analysis: 
Table 10: Regression with Altman Z-Score 
 
 
Issuer name (Company)
Announcement 
date
Working capital / 
total assets
Retained earnings / 
total assets EBIT / total assets
Equity market value 
/ total liabilities Sales / total assets Altman Z-Score
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.2 1.9 1.9
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 -0.1 0.1 0.0 1.0 2.1 2.7
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.8 0.8 2.1
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 0.2 0.3 0.1 1.2 1.5 3.0
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.8 1.6
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.9 1.7
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.6 0.6
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.6 1.3 1.8
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.1 1.3
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 0.2 -0.1 0.0 8.0 0.9 6.0
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 0.0 0.2 -0.1 0.3 1.5 1.8
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.1 1.5
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.7 1.6 2.1
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 0.0 0.1 0.1 2.2 0.7 2.2
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 -0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.4 0.6 0.6
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.7 1.6 2.4
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.9 1.2
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1 1.0 0.7
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.2
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.5
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.2 2.1
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 -0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.6
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 -0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 1.0 1.1
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 -0.3 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.3 1.2
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.4 1.8 2.6
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.3 1.0
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 -0.2 0.3 0.0 1.3 1.7 2.7
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.3 1.0 1.5
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 -0.2 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.9 0.8
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 1.1
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 0.3 0.4 0.1 1.2 1.7 3.5
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 -0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.9
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.3 0.9 1.7
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 -0.1 0.1 0.0 2.0 0.3 1.5
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.6 1.0 1.7
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.4
Altman Z-Score Calculations
Altman regression - Robustness check
Reference period 60 days 120 days 252 days Average
Multiple R 1.1 % 1.3 % 1.8 % 1.4 %
R Square 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Adjusted R Square -2.9 % -2.9 % -2.9 % -2.9 %
Standard Error 1.7 % 1.7 % 1.7 % 1.7 %
Altman Z-Score regression
Reference period Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t stat p value
Intercept -0.0059 0.005 -1.098 0.280
Altman z-score 0.0002 0.003 0.063 0.950
Intercept -0.0061 0.005 -1.151 0.258
Altman z-score 0.0002 0.003 0.075 0.940
Intercept -0.0064 0.005 -1.185 0.244
Altman z-score 0.0003 0.003 0.104 0.917
60 days
120 days
252 days
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The slope of the regression is slightly positive and the p value ranges for the Altman 
Z-Score coefficient ranges from 0.92-0.95. The result is therefore not statistically 
significant. The R-square is on average 0.0% between the robustness checks. The 
adjusted R-square is negative for all the reference periods. The R-square implies 
that the Altman Z-Score does not explain almost any of the variation in the market 
reaction to a hybrid bond announcement. The conclusion that can be drawn from 
this is that potential bankruptcy risk of an issuer does not correlate significantly with 
how successful the market reaction to a hybrid bond announcement would be. 
 
Regressing market reaction with the years until first call 
The years until first call of the hybrid bond is an interesting independent variable to 
test. An earlier first call date might show that the company is using the hybrid bonds 
as a short-term financing option. The hypothesis is that the earlier the first call date, 
the more negative the market reaction to the announcement. 
Table 11: Regression with years until first call 
 
 
The slope of the regression is slightly positive and the p value ranges for the years 
until first call coefficient ranges from 0.89-0.93. The result is therefore not 
statistically significant. The R-square is on average 0.1% between the robustness 
checks. The adjusted R-square is negative for all the reference periods. The R-
square implies that years until first call does not explain much of the variation in the 
First call date regression - Robustness check
Reference period 60 days 120 days 252 days Average
Multiple R 1.6 % 2.7 % 2.5 % 2.3 %
R Square 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Adjusted R Square -2.9 % -2.9 % -2.9 % -2.9 %
Standard Error 1.7 % 1.7 % 1.7 % 1.7 %
Years until first call regression
Reference period Coefficient Estimate Std. Error t stat p value
Intercept -0.0068 0.012 -0.542 0.592
Years until first call 0.0003 0.003 0.094 0.926
Intercept -0.0077 0.012 -0.622 0.538
Years until first call 0.0005 0.003 0.157 0.876
Intercept -0.0077 0.012 -0.615 0.543
Years until first call 0.0005 0.003 0.146 0.885
60 days
120 days
252 days
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market reaction to a hybrid bond announcement. The conclusion that can be drawn 
from this is that regardless of how long-term or short-term the hybrid bond is created 
to be, this does not correlate significantly with how positive or negative the market 
reaction to a hybrid bond announcement would be. 
 
3.3. Analysis of findings 
The first research question of this thesis is: 
1. How are Finnish hybrid bonds typically structured and how do they differ from 
hybrid bonds in other markets? 
In the Literature Review, the typical structure, terms and features of hybrid bonds 
were explored both on an international level and on a Finnish level through 
academic literature and an interview of a debt capital markets professional. It was 
identified that while Finnish hybrid bonds are similar to hybrid bonds in other 
European countries, there are a few notable differences. Finnish hybrid bonds are 
typically perpetual in maturity in almost all cases, have a first call date ranging from 
2 years to 5 years from issuance, have significantly higher coupon step-ups at the 
call dates, do not typically include replacement language and do not place significant 
emphasis on the credit rating agency equity credit classifications for hybrid bonds 
as none of the companies issuing hybrid bonds in Finland have had credit ratings.  
The second research question of this thesis is: 
2. What is the impact of a hybrid bond announcement on company share price? 
In the Literature Review, it was hypothesized that the announcement effect would 
be negative due to the signalling effects of pecking order theory, however, there is 
also some justification for a potentially positive market reaction. It was also found 
that past academic research on similar products such as preferred shares resulted 
in negative abnormal returns upon announcement. 
The raw data was analysed for three different reference periods. When analysing 
the robustness checks between 60 day, 120 day and 252 trading day reference 
periods, the tests utilizing the 60 day reference period tended to be more statistically 
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significant in most of the tests. It could be argued in this case, that a shorter 
reference period would be more applicable as a half year or full trading year time 
frame may result in broader market reactions influencing the reference period return. 
For instance, considering that the financial crisis began around 2007-2008, if we 
utilize a 252 trading day reference period, major negative market movements 
happening in, for instance, early 2008 could negatively influence the reference 
returns of companies issuing hybrid bonds in late 2008 or early 2009, thereby 
leading to more positive market reactions to hybrid bond announcements compared 
to reference returns in these cases. The findings therefore mainly draw conclusions 
based on the shorter 60 day reference period as it seems to be more applicable and 
relevant in this case. 
Based on the analysis of the data, a negative market-adjusted stock price reaction 
of -0.6% on average is observed during the issuance of a hybrid bond. This is a 
finding that is in line with academic research on preferred shares in other markets 
as identified in section 2.1.2 If considering the possibility of a positive market-
adjusted reaction due to the numerous benefits of hybrid bonds, a two-tailed t-test 
suggests at a 5% significance level that the market reacts negatively to a hybrid 
bond announcement. A sign test was also conducted in order to identify whether the 
signs of the market-adjusted reactions provide any insights as to the nature of the 
reaction. The sign test shows that a negative stock price reaction is statistically 
significant at a 10% significance level. However, it should be noted that the 
robustness check for the sign test indicated that there is significant volatility in the 
result, dependent on the length of the reference period. A statistically significant 
negative market reaction provides supporting evidence that equity investors would 
view the hybrid bond issue as a negative signal on the company’s condition. 
The third research question of this thesis is: 
3. What factors correlate with the market reactions to hybrid bond 
announcements? 
This research question was tested for three different factors. The first factor was the 
coupon of the hybrid bond issue. The test did not identify a statistically significant 
relationship between the hybrid bond coupon and the market-adjusted stock price 
reaction to a hybrid bond announcement. Nevertheless, there was indication that 
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the coupon of the hybrid bond issue and the market reaction may be negatively 
correlated. This seems logical as this could imply that a higher coupon could lead 
to a lower market reaction (less earnings for equity than otherwise anticipated) or it 
could display to some extent the demand level for the hybrid bond issue. 
The Altman Z-Score at the time of the announcement was also calculated to serve 
as a measure for the bankruptcy risk of a company. It was regressed with the market 
reaction to test whether the bankruptcy risk of a company has influence on market 
reaction to a hybrid bond announcement. The regression analysis indicated that 
there is no statistically significant correlation between these two variables. This is 
an interesting insight as it would imply that markets view the hybrid bond as being 
just as viable of a financing option in companies with higher bankruptcy risk as 
companies that are otherwise solvent. As the hybrid bonds currently suffer from 
some negative connotations due to their use in insolvency cases, this insight would 
imply that the negative connotation might be unjustified.  
The final regression analysis conducted was regarding the time to first call. This 
would provide an indication on whether markets prefer if the hybrid bonds are 
utilized as a short-term or long-term financing option. This regression analysis did 
not identify any statistically significant relationship between the market reaction and 
the years until first call. This would suggest that the markets are rather indifferent 
towards the use of hybrid bonds to satisfy short-term liquidity or balance sheet 
strengthening needs or long-term needs such as financing the company over the 
long run. 
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4. Conclusion 
4.1. Summary 
The first hybrid bonds in Europe were originated in 2005 as a response to Basel 
frameworks. Hybrid bonds have seen significant demand over the years in separate 
waves in Finland after 2008. Hybrid bonds offer flexible and attractive benefits 
through the combination of features from debt financing and equity financing for 
issuers and relatively high coupons for financiers. However, market reactions to 
hybrid bond announcements have not been tested in academia in the past. This 
thesis explores the typical terms of hybrid bonds in the Finnish and European 
markets. 
In the Literature Review, the structure of Finnish hybrid bonds was compared to the 
structures of other European hybrid bonds. Finnish hybrid bonds have a few notable 
differences including entirely perpetual maturities, earlier first call dates, higher 
coupon step-ups, absence of replacement language and less regard for credit rating 
agency equity credit than European hybrid bonds. 
In the second part of the thesis, market adjusted announcement returns were 
calculated, and it was found that on average a hybrid bond announcement 
decreases share price by -0.6%. The result is statistically significant according to a 
one tailed t-test. The negative relationship provides supporting evidence that 
pecking order theory might outweigh the tax benefits of trade-off theory in the 
Finnish hybrid bond market. The finding is in line with academic research regarding 
stock price reactions to preferred share announcements in other markets. 
Finally, a regression analysis of coupons suggests a negative correlation between 
market reaction and coupons, although, a statistically significant correlation was not 
identified between the variables. Regression on other factors including bankruptcy 
risk and years until first call indicate that there is no clear relationship between the 
factors and the stock price reaction. This could imply that markets in Finland 
perceive hybrid bonds as being just as viable of an alternative for companies 
regardless of solvency position or planned length of the financing arrangement. 
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4.2. Ideas for future research 
This research could be expanded to other regions within Europe. This includes both 
research on the regulations and structural differences of hybrid bonds between 
countries. It would be interesting to identify whether different markets and regions 
have significantly different market reactions to hybrid bond announcements.  
Another area of interest is whether the credit rating agency equity credit influences 
the market reactions. For this, the study would need to be expanded to other 
countries where companies with credit ratings have issued hybrid bonds. 
Also, hybrid bonds may be an interesting topic to further expand research on the 
CR-CS hypothesis and market timing theories. Regarding CR-CS hypothesis, for 
instance, if companies closer to credit rating changes are less inclined to issue 
senior debt, would they be more inclined to issue hybrid bonds to further strengthen 
their balance sheet and participate in profitable projects? Regarding market timing, 
if companies’ management consider their shares to be undervalued, would the 
management be more inclined to issue hybrid bonds rather than issue new shares? 
Also, would companies be more inclined to time the market for perpetual, or long-
term hybrid bonds when interest rates are low? 
Also, it would be interesting if an analysis was conducted on whether the company’s 
use of funds would have an impact on the market reaction to a hybrid bond 
announcement. A notable outlier was witnessed in the Finnish dataset regarding the 
Innofactor 2013 hybrid bond issue (Globenewswire, 2013). In their press release, 
Innofactor announced that they would use the proceeds to repurchase a portion of 
their own shares used to finance a previous acquisition. This is interesting because 
Innofactor witnessed a -0.5% market adjusted stock price reaction to this 
announcement, which would be contradictory to both trade-off theory and pecking 
order theory as the issuance of debt to buy back shares should be a strong signal 
to investors unless significant agency costs are witnessed. With a wider dataset, 
some analysis regarding the use of funds may be possible. 
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4.3. Limitations of this research 
This thesis contributes to the understanding of how Finnish hybrid bonds are 
structured, how the stock market reacts to the announcement of a hybrid bond issue, 
and what factors can influence the market reaction. 
Since the data set was limited to 36 analysable data points, this may have resulted 
in a lower significance of results of especially the regression analyses. More data 
points, such as a future study considering a larger amount of hybrid bond issues 
could thus improve the robustness of the conclusions from this study. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix I: Robustness check calculations 
120 day reference period calculations:  
 
Reference period (days) 120
Issuer Name
Announcement 
Date (AD) Issue Date
Adjusted 
closing price 
(EUR, AD - 1)
Adjusted closing 
price (EUR, AD + 
1)
Adjusted 
closing price at 
beginning of 
reference 
period
Daily reference 
return (%)
Daily 
announcement 
return (%)
Market reaction 
(Ann. return - 
Ref. return)
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 17.9.2018 4.18 4.16 4.80 -0.1 % -0.3 % -0.2 %
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 16.6.2017 8.03 7.96 7.78 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.4 %
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 31.5.2017 5.85 5.86 6.07 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.2 %
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 27.5.2016 11.87 11.80 12.01 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 24.3.2016 4.43 4.30 5.88 -0.2 % -1.5 % -1.3 %
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 22.3.2016 3.90 3.96 3.30 0.1 % 0.8 % 0.6 %
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 17.12.2015 9.73 9.15 9.09 0.1 % -3.0 % -3.0 %
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 25.11.2015 4.66 4.71 4.65 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.5 %
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 13.10.2015 3.25 3.17 3.45 -0.1 % -1.2 % -1.1 %
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 30.3.2015 4.34 4.26 2.78 0.4 % -0.9 % -1.2 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 11.3.2014 16.31 16.57 17.60 -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.9 %
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 20.2.2014 2.66 2.68 2.65 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 10.2.2014 2.53 2.43 2.78 -0.1 % -2.0 % -1.9 %
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 20.12.2013 1.13 1.11 0.71 0.4 % -0.9 % -1.3 %
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 12.12.2013 11.51 11.33 9.67 0.1 % -0.8 % -0.9 %
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 18.11.2013 8.42 8.72 8.61 0.0 % 1.7 % 1.7 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 2.10.2013 11.61 11.40 13.64 -0.1 % -0.9 % -0.7 %
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 2.9.2013 1.86 1.84 2.11 -0.1 % -0.3 % -0.2 %
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 27.5.2013 1.01 0.92 0.90 0.1 % -4.5 % -4.6 %
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 26.3.2013 3.86 3.89 3.33 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.3 %
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 28.12.2012 3.08 3.05 3.04 0.0 % -0.5 % -0.5 %
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 5.12.2012 4.02 4.17 3.63 0.1 % 1.9 % 1.8 %
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 26.11.2012 2.31 2.30 2.11 0.1 % -0.2 % -0.3 %
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 29.3.2012 3.75 3.68 4.51 -0.2 % -0.9 % -0.8 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 30.3.2012 21.94 21.29 22.27 0.0 % -1.5 % -1.5 %
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 15.1.2010 0.57 0.50 0.66 -0.1 % -6.1 % -5.9 %
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 1.12.2009 3.08 3.04 3.09 0.0 % -0.7 % -0.7 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 25.11.2009 8.28 8.46 6.41 0.2 % 1.1 % 0.9 %
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 7.10.2009 4.64 4.64 4.19 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.1 %
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 29.4.2009 5.29 5.51 5.39 0.0 % 2.1 % 2.1 %
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 31.3.2009 3.67 3.55 9.05 -0.7 % -1.8 % -1.0 %
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 26.3.2009 5.43 4.96 11.59 -0.6 % -4.5 % -3.9 %
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 12.3.2009 4.24 4.36 7.29 -0.5 % 1.4 % 1.8 %
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 5.12.2008 1.33 1.30 2.65 -0.6 % -1.2 % -0.6 %
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 28.11.2008 5.71 5.15 7.55 -0.2 % -5.0 % -4.8 %
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 27.6.2008 4.04 4.06 4.97 -0.2 % 0.3 % 0.5 %
Min -0.7 % -6.1 % -5.9 %
Lower quartile -0.1 % -1.3 % -1.2 %
Median 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.5 %
Average -0.1 % -0.8 % -0.7 %
Upper quartile 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.3 %
Max 0.4 % 2.1 % 2.1 %
Standard deviation 0.2 % 1.9 % 1.8 %
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120 day reference period market adjustments: 
 
Reference period (days) 120
Issuer Name
Announcement 
Date (AD)
Daily reference 
return (%)
Daily 
announcement 
return (%)
Daily reference 
market return
Daily 
announcement 
market return
Market adjusted 
reference 
return
Market adjusted 
announcement 
return
Market adjusted 
market reaction 
(Ann. return - Ref. 
return)
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 -0.1 % -0.3 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.2 % 0.1 % 0.3 %
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 0.0 % -0.4 % 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.1 % -0.4 % -0.3 %
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 % -0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 %
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.1 % 0.2 % 0.1 % -0.5 % -0.6 %
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 -0.2 % -1.5 % 0.0 % 0.5 % -0.3 % -2.1 % -1.8 %
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 0.1 % 0.8 % 0.0 % -0.4 % 0.1 % 1.2 % 1.0 %
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 0.1 % -3.0 % 0.0 % -0.8 % 0.1 % -2.2 % -2.2 %
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 0.0 % 0.5 % 0.0 % 1.0 % 0.0 % -0.5 % -0.5 %
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 -0.1 % -1.2 % -0.1 % -0.9 % 0.1 % -0.2 % -0.3 %
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 0.4 % -0.9 % 0.1 % 0.7 % 0.2 % -1.6 % -1.8 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.1 % 1.3 % -0.2 % -0.5 % -0.3 %
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.1 % 0.2 % 0.3 %
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 -0.1 % -2.0 % 0.1 % -1.3 % -0.2 % -0.7 % -0.5 %
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 0.4 % -0.9 % 0.2 % 0.2 % 0.2 % -1.1 % -1.3 %
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 0.1 % -0.8 % 0.2 % -1.4 % 0.0 % 0.6 % 0.6 %
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 0.0 % 1.7 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.1 % 2.1 % 2.2 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 -0.1 % -0.9 % 0.1 % 0.3 % -0.2 % -1.2 % -0.9 %
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 -0.1 % -0.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % -0.1 % -0.3 % -0.2 %
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 0.1 % -4.5 % 0.1 % -0.2 % -0.1 % -4.2 % -4.2 %
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 0.1 % 0.4 % 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 0.0 % -0.5 % 0.2 % 0.7 % -0.2 % -1.1 % -1.0 %
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 0.1 % 1.9 % 0.1 % 1.1 % 0.0 % 0.7 % 0.8 %
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 0.1 % -0.2 % 0.1 % -0.3 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 -0.2 % -0.9 % 0.1 % 0.2 % -0.3 % -1.2 % -0.9 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 0.0 % -1.5 % 0.1 % 1.1 % -0.2 % -2.6 % -2.4 %
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 -0.1 % -6.1 % 0.2 % -0.7 % -0.3 % -5.4 % -5.0 %
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 0.0 % -0.7 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.2 % -0.2 % -0.1 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 0.2 % 1.1 % 0.1 % 1.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.3 % -0.8 % -0.3 % 0.8 % 1.0 %
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 0.0 % 2.1 % -0.1 % 1.4 % 0.1 % 0.7 % 0.6 %
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 -0.7 % -1.8 % -0.3 % -3.0 % -0.4 % 1.3 % 1.7 %
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 -0.6 % -4.5 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.2 % -4.4 % -4.2 %
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 -0.5 % 1.4 % -0.5 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 1.3 % 1.2 %
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 -0.6 % -1.2 % -0.5 % 0.2 % -0.1 % -1.4 % -1.3 %
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 -0.2 % -5.0 % -0.5 % -3.2 % 0.3 % -1.9 % -2.1 %
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 -0.2 % 0.3 % -0.1 % -1.0 % -0.1 % 1.3 % 1.4 %
Min -0.7 % -6.1 % -0.4 % -5.4 % -5.0 %
Lower quartile -0.1 % -1.3 % -0.2 % -1.2 % -1.3 %
Median 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.4 % -0.3 %
Average -0.1 % -0.8 % -0.1 % -0.6 % -0.6 %
Upper quartile 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.1 % 0.3 % 0.4 %
Max 0.4 % 2.1 % 0.3 % 2.1 % 2.2 %
Standard deviation 0.2 % 1.9 % 0.2 % 1.6 % 1.6 %
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120 day reference period market adjusted market reaction histogram: 
 
75 
252 day reference period calculations: 
 
Reference period (days) 252
Issuer Name
Announcement 
Date (AD) Issue Date
Adjusted 
closing price 
(EUR, AD - 1)
Adjusted closing 
price (EUR, AD + 
1)
Adjusted 
closing price at 
beginning of 
reference 
period
Daily reference 
return (%)
Daily 
announcement 
return (%)
Market reaction 
(Ann. return - 
Ref. return)
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 17.9.2018 4.18 4.16 4.84 -0.1 % -0.3 % -0.2 %
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 16.6.2017 8.03 7.96 7.30 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.4 %
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 31.5.2017 5.85 5.86 6.01 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 27.5.2016 11.87 11.80 12.43 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.3 %
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 24.3.2016 4.43 4.30 6.95 -0.2 % -1.5 % -1.4 %
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 22.3.2016 3.90 3.96 3.36 0.1 % 0.8 % 0.7 %
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 17.12.2015 9.73 9.15 11.76 -0.1 % -3.0 % -2.9 %
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 25.11.2015 4.66 4.71 3.53 0.1 % 0.5 % 0.4 %
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 13.10.2015 3.25 3.17 2.66 0.1 % -1.2 % -1.3 %
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 30.3.2015 4.34 4.26 3.10 0.1 % -0.9 % -1.0 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 11.3.2014 16.31 16.57 18.53 -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.8 %
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 20.2.2014 2.66 2.68 2.58 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 10.2.2014 2.53 2.43 1.84 0.1 % -2.0 % -2.1 %
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 20.12.2013 1.13 1.11 0.50 0.3 % -0.9 % -1.2 %
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 12.12.2013 11.51 11.33 10.68 0.0 % -0.8 % -0.8 %
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 18.11.2013 8.42 8.72 8.01 0.0 % 1.7 % 1.7 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 2.10.2013 11.61 11.40 14.52 -0.1 % -0.9 % -0.8 %
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 2.9.2013 1.86 1.84 3.30 -0.2 % -0.3 % -0.1 %
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 27.5.2013 1.01 0.92 1.04 0.0 % -4.5 % -4.5 %
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 26.3.2013 3.86 3.89 3.49 0.0 % 0.4 % 0.3 %
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 28.12.2012 3.08 3.05 3.70 -0.1 % -0.5 % -0.4 %
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 5.12.2012 4.02 4.17 3.31 0.1 % 1.9 % 1.8 %
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 26.11.2012 2.31 2.30 2.95 -0.1 % -0.2 % -0.1 %
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 29.3.2012 3.75 3.68 6.76 -0.2 % -0.9 % -0.7 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 30.3.2012 21.94 21.29 28.03 -0.1 % -1.5 % -1.4 %
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 15.1.2010 0.57 0.50 0.60 0.0 % -6.1 % -6.0 %
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 1.12.2009 3.08 3.04 3.64 -0.1 % -0.7 % -0.6 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 25.11.2009 8.28 8.46 6.67 0.1 % 1.1 % 1.0 %
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 7.10.2009 4.64 4.64 4.77 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 %
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 29.4.2009 5.29 5.51 14.65 -0.4 % 2.1 % 2.5 %
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 31.3.2009 3.67 3.55 15.03 -0.6 % -1.8 % -1.2 %
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 26.3.2009 5.43 4.96 12.64 -0.3 % -4.5 % -4.1 %
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 12.3.2009 4.24 4.36 10.45 -0.4 % 1.4 % 1.7 %
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 5.12.2008 1.33 1.30 3.30 -0.4 % -1.2 % -0.8 %
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 28.11.2008 5.71 5.15 9.22 -0.2 % -5.0 % -4.9 %
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 27.6.2008 4.04 4.06 7.18 -0.2 % 0.3 % 0.6 %
Min -0.6 % -6.1 % -6.0 %
Lower quartile -0.2 % -1.3 % -1.2 %
Median 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.4 %
Average -0.1 % -0.8 % -0.7 %
Upper quartile 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.4 %
Max 0.3 % 2.1 % 2.5 %
Standard deviation 0.2 % 1.9 % 1.9 %
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252 day reference period market adjustments: 
 
Reference period (days) 252
Issuer Name
Announcement 
Date (AD)
Daily reference 
return (%)
Daily 
announcement 
return (%)
Daily reference 
market return
Daily 
announcement 
market return
Market adjusted 
reference 
return
Market adjusted 
announcement 
return
Market adjusted 
market reaction 
(Ann. return - Ref. 
return)
HKScan OYJ 30.8.2018 -0.1 % -0.3 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 %
Caverion OYJ 9.6.2017 0.0 % -0.4 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.4 %
Rapala VMC OYJ 24.5.2017 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 % -0.1 % 0.0 % 0.1 %
Aspo OYJ 17.5.2016 0.0 % -0.3 % 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.0 % -0.5 % -0.5 %
Outotec OYJ 14.3.2016 -0.2 % -1.5 % 0.0 % 0.5 % -0.1 % -2.1 % -1.9 %
SRV Group OYJ 9.3.2016 0.1 % 0.8 % 0.0 % -0.4 % 0.1 % 1.2 % 1.1 %
Stockmann OYJ Abp 10.12.2015 -0.1 % -3.0 % 0.0 % -0.8 % -0.1 % -2.2 % -2.0 %
Poyry OYJ 17.11.2015 0.1 % 0.5 % 0.1 % 1.0 % 0.1 % -0.5 % -0.6 %
Finnair OYJ 28.9.2015 0.1 % -1.2 % 0.0 % -0.9 % 0.1 % -0.2 % -0.3 %
SSH Communications Security Oyj 19.3.2015 0.1 % -0.9 % 0.1 % 0.7 % 0.0 % -1.6 % -1.6 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 4.3.2014 -0.1 % 0.8 % 0.1 % 1.3 % -0.1 % -0.5 % -0.4 %
Oriola-KD OYJ 13.2.2014 0.0 % 0.2 % 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.1 % 0.2 % 0.2 %
Suominen OYJ 31.1.2014 0.1 % -2.0 % 0.1 % -1.3 % 0.1 % -0.7 % -0.8 %
Innofactor Oyj 17.12.2013 0.3 % -0.9 % 0.1 % 0.2 % 0.3 % -1.1 % -1.3 %
Sanoma OYJ 2.12.2013 0.0 % -0.8 % 0.1 % -1.4 % -0.1 % 0.6 % 0.7 %
Aspo OYJ 11.11.2013 0.0 % 1.7 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.1 % 2.1 % 2.2 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 19.9.2013 -0.1 % -0.9 % 0.1 % 0.3 % -0.2 % -1.2 % -1.0 %
Componenta OYJ 28.8.2013 -0.2 % -0.3 % 0.1 % 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.3 % 0.0 %
Panostaja OYJ 16.5.2013 0.0 % -4.5 % 0.1 % -0.2 % -0.1 % -4.2 % -4.2 %
Technopolis OYJ 19.3.2013 0.0 % 0.4 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 %
SRV Group OYJ 18.12.2012 -0.1 % -0.5 % 0.1 % 0.7 % -0.2 % -1.1 % -1.0 %
Sponda OYJ 21.11.2012 0.1 % 1.9 % 0.1 % 1.1 % 0.0 % 0.7 % 0.7 %
Finnair OYJ 13.11.2012 -0.1 % -0.2 % 0.0 % -0.3 % -0.1 % 0.1 % 0.2 %
Componenta OYJ 29.3.2012 -0.2 % -0.9 % -0.1 % 0.2 % -0.2 % -1.2 % -1.0 %
Lemminkainen OYJ 23.3.2012 -0.1 % -1.5 % -0.1 % 1.1 % 0.0 % -2.6 % -2.6 %
Trainers House Oyj 12.1.2010 0.0 % -6.1 % 0.1 % -0.7 % -0.1 % -5.4 % -5.3 %
Etteplan OYJ 18.11.2009 -0.1 % -0.7 % 0.1 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.2 % -0.1 %
Ahlstrom OYJ 9.11.2009 0.1 % 1.1 % 0.0 % 1.0 % 0.1 % 0.1 % 0.0 %
Finnair OYJ 18.9.2009 0.0 % 0.0 % -0.1 % -0.8 % 0.0 % 0.8 % 0.7 %
Cramo OYJ 15.4.2009 -0.4 % 2.1 % -0.3 % 1.4 % -0.1 % 0.7 % 0.9 %
Ponsse Oy 27.3.2009 -0.6 % -1.8 % -0.3 % -3.0 % -0.3 % 1.3 % 1.5 %
Finnlines OYJ 23.3.2009 -0.3 % -4.5 % -0.3 % -0.1 % -0.1 % -4.4 % -4.4 %
Amer Sports Oyj 25.2.2009 -0.4 % 1.4 % -0.3 % 0.1 % 0.0 % 1.3 % 1.3 %
CapMan Oyj 5.12.2008 -0.4 % -1.2 % -0.3 % 0.2 % -0.1 % -1.4 % -1.3 %
Huhtamaki OYJ 19.11.2008 -0.2 % -5.0 % -0.3 % -3.2 % 0.1 % -1.9 % -2.0 %
Sponda OYJ 17.6.2008 -0.2 % 0.3 % -0.1 % -1.0 % -0.2 % 1.3 % 1.5 %
Min -0.6 % -6.1 % -0.3 % -5.4 % -5.3 %
Lower quartile -0.2 % -1.3 % -0.1 % -1.2 % -1.3 %
Median 0.0 % -0.4 % -0.1 % -0.4 % -0.3 %
Average -0.1 % -0.8 % -0.1 % -0.6 % -0.6 %
Upper quartile 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 0.4 %
Max 0.3 % 2.1 % 0.3 % 2.1 % 2.2 %
Standard deviation 0.2 % 1.9 % 0.1 % 1.6 % 1.6 %
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252 day reference period market adjusted market reaction histogram: 
 
